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# THE AZIMUTH OF LANGUAGE:
# EXPLORATIONS INTO THE LIMITS OF EXPRESSION

by

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ABSTRACT

One way that we humans are different from animals is that we live in a world with language. This gives us access to a type of information which we can readily manipulate and apply to the world. This paper explores how living in the world with language influences that living.

Language is a major component in bringing the developing individual into his or her flourishing. This influence is incorporated into the individual as well as into social structures. Being embodied within both, language strongly encourages and often coerces individuals to dwell within a societally constructed form, in the institution. That is to say that the potential for living becomes restricted, guided by what is probable (rule governed); the calling of a world is reduced to a command. To remain fixed in instituted form is to sacrifice the depth of self constitution. To dwell within constitution, on the other hand, is to live within possibility, where calling is the experiential depth of an individual in the world.

In exploring what it means to create and be created by the institution several "markers" come to light. These are areas where language seems to go beyond the instituting. This is in terms of both social structure and taken for granted limitations; it seems to go beyond. These markers become hints and flexible guides in the quest to explore what may be the limiting aspect of language. Through an

exploration of notions such as "vagueness", "silence", "saying", "fissure" and "otherness", this paper suggests that in terms of language, "limit" is not to be sought at the extremity but is something which continually traverses the center of even our most fundamental notions.

The quest also suggests that prescriptions from and of language are more what we subscribe to than what we find as apriori boundaries. The subscription, however, runs deep, for it is manifest in both the individual and in social structures. These structures also evolve with and are a part of the evolution toward new boundaries. The result is that the assumptions of the former are incorporated into those of the latter and thus suffer many of the same instituting features.

The paper ends with several examples which are suggestions as to the direction we may proceed in an attempt to explore constituted meaning. They are suggestions on how to go beyond language.

## PREFACE: TOWARD A CO-AUTHORED TEXT

> Seeking merely means putting oneself in a suitable state of finding, thanks to some fluke or a propitious sleep. It means preparing a "field" for that lucky spark.
>
> (Valéry 1970, p.287)

Is there a less haphazard path towards preparation of this "field"? Is there some special nature of "fluke" that eludes us? What are the qualities of this "spark"? Is there a particular holding which encourages a state of readiness to cross this gap? In that spark, the sudden exciting illumination is the awe, the spectacle of life reduced to an instant. It is that sudden great leap which great minds often spend a lifetime detailing into a conception.

This arduous detailing is for the rest of us; it is a translating into a structured speaking. What is more incredible: that such leaps occur at all? or, that so many of us seem to be passed by? Must we forever be left with the transcribed-leap, left to live only within transcription? Only one aspect of that spark has been harnessed and I am left to live within mundane application. Have I been robbed of the fullness of the leap and left with "what is left over" or perhaps worse, left with "what is seen fit for

me to use". In this burgeoning living, am I relegated to a wasteland, a wasteland with increasingly "interesting" things to look at and play with; a wasteland which preoccupies me and/or perhaps precludes me from the experience of that leap, of that "spark" itself?

On the other hand, perhaps this is not a "wasteland" at all. Am I not blessed to be able to avoid and to have avoided the powerful onslaught of the unknown; an onslaught which may obsess the rest of one's life.

This paper begins the task of looking toward these questions by tracing how the transcription comes through and is influenced by language, not only in the direct sense of putting experience into words, but also in the way that social culture grows in and through language. This involves how language structures the individual, as well as how the characteristics of language are embedded in and serve a social structure.

Since I am dealing with language, I am caught in a double bind. First, I am using language to describe itself. Second, I try to use language to go beyond itself. Within the structure of my writing is the very trap which I attempt to go beyond. As a strategy to highlight at least this problem but also in an attempt to go beyond it, the words are sometimes used in unfamiliar conjunctions. Structural aspects are often suppressed in favour of an aesthetic of suggestion. On first reading, this may be a <u>shock</u> to the

reader, a choking out of a meaning which comes too much from the structure; that is the reason for the suppression - to have the meaning come from elsewhere.

I have used the term "suppressed" and not "deleted" for indeed the words are within structures embedded within structures. Hopefully, the choking is sufficient and does not lead to asphyxiation. Perhaps the most influential structure which I have not been able to deal with explicitly is the fact that the work is embedded within the University; the university is a context which is a "pre-preface". It is the larger context in which the paper will be read. It is hoped that this context will not lead to a double coup; a choke of the choking.

The words and structures which I use are "jackets" harnessed into suggestive apparitions. These jackets are as much the meaning of the work as the meaning which may at first seem to come from the words.

The aim of this work is to say something to the reader beyond a strict analysis of each word. To begin with an analysis of each word is to miss the non-point. What is written in black and white is there to question the reading. This is done in the belief that there is an inevitable re-casting of perspective as multiple questions ask themselves (in the form of statements) of the reader (co-author). Neither the question nor a possible answer by themselves are the point, yet each can be a marker which suggests that one

is proceeding in an oriented fashion. This attitude toward the text is an important component of the goal of the text.

As a path of exploration of the limits of language, the text as co-authored meaning is often difficult to read. Often I am attempting to minimize the meaning of the words in order to encourage other meaning to come forth. This may be contrary to assumptions which were inherent in how we were taught to read, and, therefore, an affront to the process itself. In this regard I would like to briefly explore the notions of "readerly" and "writerly" as developed by Roland Barthes (1974).

Barthes objects that most of the writings which we have called 'literature' are characterized by a separation which the literary institution maintains between the producer of the text and its user, between its owner and its customer, between its author and its reader. Only if a work makes "the reader no longer a consumer, but a producer of the text" (1974, p. 4) is it truly writerly.

The writerly is not a thing, a production. It is productive and begs to be constituted in order for it to achieve itself:

> the writerly text is <u>ourselves</u> <u>writing</u>, before the infinite play of the world (the world as function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular system (Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the plurality of entrances, the

opening of networks, the infinity of languages. (1974, p. 5)

> The writerly is the novelistic without the novel, poetry without the poem, the essay without the dissertation, writing without style, production without product, structuration without structure. (1974, p.5)

Barthes argues that the purposes of 'literature' are best fulfilled by works which are presently "unreadable" for they challenge our already instituted forms. Against the "readable" works which conform to traditional codes and models of intelligibility, he places the "writable". These are works that we do not yet know how to read but can only write and must in effect write as we read.

Readerly texts, on the other hand, are products, and they are what makes up the mass of what we call literature.

> This reader is thereby plunged into a kind of idleness -he is intransitive: ... he is left with no more than the poor freedom either to accept or reject the text: reading is nothing more than a referendum. (1974, p.5)

The readerly texts are committed to a closed system. They are produced according to the goals of this system and they are devoted to the law of the signified.

The writerly has no beginning and it is reversible. It encourages us to appreciate the "plural" which constitutes

the text instead of giving it meaning. In the interaction of all its parts, no single part surpasses any other. The text is a plethora of signifiers, "not a structure of signifieds" (1974, p.5). There is no entry point or exit; all points share authority. For the plural text, there is not a grammar, nor a structure nor a logic. In so much as one or all of these (grammar, structure or logic) bursts forth, to this degree the text is incompletely plural. In participating in the writerly, I do not run the risk of being objective nor subjective. To read is not merely to complete the complementary act of writing; it is working.

As a result of this perspective Barthes is an agent of what he calls "the death of the author". The author should be deposed from its central position in literary studies and critical thinking.

> We now know that a text is not a line of words releasing a single <u>theological</u> meaning (the "message" of an Author-God) but a multidimensional space in which a rarity of writings, none of them original, blend and clash (1968, p. 146).

Within the limited plural of actual texts, I must attempt to cross a horizon where neither text nor "I" is an end. In a text which is produced or created, that is <u>constituted</u>, to forget meaning is to affirm plurality. I go over, I cross and recross, I articulate, I release. To forget meaning is not the deficit in a performance, but it

is an assertion of irresponsibility of the text.

How can one write an actual text in such a way as to inspire this co-production of the text, the co-authoring in a reading? The writing which follows is my attempt. As an opening for the co-authoring of the text I have reproduced a poem which is found toward the end of Chapter I. In it is the questioning and manner of directing which my text takes.

The Watercolour

Here I see the work of Li Wô;
mist-ridden, searching cloud;
Absorbing pigment - pulling and pushing meaning;
**obscured** **revealed**
Here I see the words of I know not whom;
semidiaphanous, nebulous reason;
I close my eyes and allow the seeing;
**darkness** **light**
Here I see the calligraphic struggle of Teng Shih-ju;
blotted-elongated, rapid on white;
Fleeting strident shade, word is story;
**life** **death**

"The Watercolour" is an attempt to incorporate several disparate features of how people relate in and of the world. The title refers to two oblique aspects; on the one hand it designates the highly skilled Art Form of composing meaning

through colour on paper; on the other hand it is a medium, the fundamental building block of that art.

Li Wô is an ancient master at the art of watercolour painting; a peculiar aspect of this art is the haziness, the lack of clarity with which the forms are put one against the other onto the surface. The sharply defined edges of objects in life are here softened and run unevenly into the paper. Yet, it is within this "fuzziness", this blurring before our eyes, which the master turns into the most profound meaning. It is almost ironic that by covering, by obscuring the defining characteristics we may reveal meaning. Perhaps this is one of the true marks of the master, the one who controls the misty colours to reveal what remains obscure in life.

The next line shifts us to a painting (writing) of a text; a text written in our familiar alphabetic script. The particular work which I am looking at is built on reason, yet the "difficulty" of the passage is such that the meaning itself is nebulous. The reason is there, behind and in the words, yet I struggle to find the revelation. In the depths of concentration, I momentarily leave the words, this painting which is before me. I close my eyes; it becomes dark, yet in this darkness emerges the light, a sudden understanding. The grasping of the passage, the light, seems to grow out of the darkness.

The last stanza returns us to oriental art. This time

to a more demanding art; still of watercolour, still of meaning. This time it is to calligraphy. The strokes carry the emotion and zest of the arm. There is never a stopping, a retracing or a hesitating. The depth of the meaning demands the whole. A painting, yet more; a language, yet more. In the art of a single word can be the story of life; a life which remains before us in the blotches on paper. This last stanza asks how the painting of our alphabetic writing differs from the painting of oriental writing. How can English capture this lived stridency? Although our language brings us into our flourishing, does it kill a possible bursting forth as well?

There are six words in bold face; each couple is the summation of the three preceding lines and demarcates the end of the "stanza". They are also meant to stand on their own. They are poetically turned towards the reader and ask whether there is not something in this curious observation that through obscuring, revelation comes; through darkness, light dawns; through a flourishing, comes dissolution. In the last couple the reader is confronted with "life" and "death". They seemed to be juxtaposed, almost out of place. The question posed is: Is life what obscures, is it our darkness?

At various places throughout the text, emphasis naturally gathers around particular words; these words grow

out of the writing and are not meant to stand as abstractions representing aspects of being. The particular word is a horizon; as a horizon it rests within being. Yet what has grown out of and through the writing attempts to point to a conjunction with otherness (other than being). A word like "chopsticks" opens up in all directions (and in no directions). The flavour of this writing is not towards the word; it is meant as a taste of openness (both the acting and the place); openness as a rich succulence which permits (encourages) a conjunction where Being and Otherness become possibilities.

E.C.
1985

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## CHAPTER I

## CALLING ON FRIENDS

The World Calls:

I could taste the crisp green of the Spring foliage. With practiced care I grasped the rail and lowered myself to the seat; the last few inches rushed forward to squeeze out a sudden sigh. I languished in the freshness and the chirping of several youngsters running in unconnected patterns across my view. One boy in particular caught my attention. He had separated himself from the others, or rather he started swishing about in the bushes, while the others seemed not to miss him. With a knarled bent stick protruding from his hand, he made his way across the opening. He passed in front of me, bouncing his wand off the ground in front - often receiving a sudden jar as the end sank slightly, then sprang forward throwing out a tuft of dirt.

He passed by, paused slightly and glanced over his shoulder, then back towards his friends who by now were only sounds from around the lilacs. Hesitantly he made his way back, as if weighing what he should do, yet being drawn. I was about to offer greetings when he stooped to inspect a puddle. Most of the water had

recently evaporated, yet a shiny layer of mud, already cracking into small islands, remained. With legs bent and feet spread, his bottom almost touching the ground, he studied its face; out stretched the small hand, index finger pointing - tentatively at first, gracefully dusting the surface - then, still graceful yet with more assertion the finger pressed forward. A large smile filled his face as he saw his mark.

What is this mysterious pull of the world? We have all, at one time or another, been a participant in this staged drama. What authorizes the mysterious pull of the world; this calling, if you will, this calling without words? Is it a gravity of excitement lost in a moment of youth in the world; in a world? What mystery speaks to a beckoned yearning - what beckoned yearning speaks to mystery?

It is not only in youth that the world's call pulls us forth. Have you never been tempted to trace a finger through a fogged window? What authors this temptation? Have you never carved out a niche with your feet in the snow while waiting for a bus? Is it perhaps this calling which is described, albeit in somewhat different culturally specific symbols, by Homer when he details Odysseus' travels past the sirens? Here the strength of the call is unmistakeable and is personified into song. What better way to describe a calling! In order to protect themselves from

this beckoning, Odysseus molds wax into the ears of his men and has himself bound to the mast.

> "Draw near," they sang, "illustrious Odysseus, flower of Achaean chivalry, and bring your ship to rest so that you may hear our voices. No seaman ever sailed his black ship past this spot without listening to the sweet tones that flow from our lips, and none that listened has not been delighted and gone on a wiser man. ..."
>
> 'The lovely voices came to me across the water, and my heart filled with such a longing to listen that with nod and frown I signed to my men to set me free.' (Homer (Lattimore Translation), 1972, p. 194)

Although the world calls, we do not always heed it, for we are <u>in</u> the world; we are also <u>of</u> the world. Do we, like Odysseus, have our arms and legs bound so that we cannot heed the call? Or are we deaf like his men who have their ears plugged with wax?

Often when we watch children we are reminded of the calling of the world. However, as adults in modern society, our way of being-in-the-world is different both in mode and means from those of the child. One major way that we manifest this divergence is how we are in the world through (dia-) language (lektos); it is also through language that

the developing child will eventually come to construct an adult world. I now turn my attention to an examination of language in respect to its influence on the calling of the world.

Looking for Sign-Posts. (The influence of language on the call of the world).

> We shall not cease from exploration
> And the end of all our exploring
> Will be to arrive where we started
> And to know the place for the first time.
> Through the unknown, remembered gate
> When the last of earth left to discover
> Is that which was the beginning;
> At the source of the longest river
> The voice of the hidden waterfall
> And the children in the apple tree
> Not known because not looked for
> But heard, half-heard, in the stillness
> Between two waves of the sea
> Quick, now here, now, always ---------
>
> T.S. Elliot, Last Stanza of "Little Gidding"

Savour the strength of the speaking ... let it speak ... pick out the muffled gurgle of cascading water, listen to the unrehearsed roles in the apple tree. Even with a renewed focussing can we be assured that our return will be

greeted with knowing? Somehow the listening itself is not enough; the words themselves are not the fact.

Upon first reading, from where does the meaning come? The meaning is a feel, a wondrous sense of statement. If I am asked to identify or articulate this feel, the meaning-as-a-whole is not clear. It escapes into haziness, into vagueness, as I attempt to focus on it. Yet the meaning of each word is not vague. How does the union of definitions yield a vagueness of the whole? That is, how can the meaning-as-a-whole, this vagueness, come from the words which are not vague? Upon receiving various descriptions of the total meaning, it is easy to say "No, that will not do" or "No, it really says more." By way of the negative, showing what it is not, this vagueness becomes a little clearer. We can say what it is not although we cannot say what it is. Who would maintain that the feel is vague; do you have a sense of what it means or do you not? The feel is invested with an **indelible tenor**; it is pathic wholeness. If we know what it is not and can feel what it is, how can we call the meaning-of-the-whole, vagueness ...? This notion lies within language. The meaning-of-the-whole is vague only from the perspective of language itself: that which cannot be put into language is that which is vague by definit-ion. Language, through the use of symbols, makes things definite; language specifies and differentiates, thereby ruling out wholeness. It realigns the shadows. To

dwell within the meanings-of-words is to lose the meaning-of-the-whole. The words must become vague for the latter to present itself, for the meaning-of-the-whole is beyond words. The question becomes, how can we use language to give clarity to experience without sacrificing its experiential depth?

> I close my eyes yet dally not. Perhaps a second maybe less. I saw this flock of birds; I don't know how many birds I saw. Was there a definite number - I live in the memory and dare not reconstruct the dream, for knowing the question, this time, the number may be there. Yet in this recollection, was the number (de)finite or in(de)finite. I saw fewer than ten birds (let us say) and more than one; but I did not see nine, eight, seven, six, five, four, three or two birds. I saw a number of birds between one and ten, but not nine, eight, seven, six, etc. Is that number, as a whole number, inconceivable? I dare say that at least I saw those birds. The seeing failed me not. Why confuse the issue with conception![1]

Words tend to rule out the unity of the wholeness, yet in our language system, the conceptual system, we see that the negation of the word, the negation of what is, occurs commonly. Thus things are presented in a dialectical

fashion; for example, being-nonbeing; tolerance-prejudice; sound-silence. We think of the latter as being the lack of the former. This lack itself is not a property of things but tells us about our language. To make this clearer it will help to think of the word as a thermometer. A thermometer points to various levels. From one arbitrary point, "o" we say we have gone below zero, moved into the region of the negative. We denote it with the negative sign. What does negative temperature feel like? What does it behave like? The word does much the same thing. The word hides yet carries a hidden standard within itself, or within the language system which is using it.

One of these hidden standards impels us to look to the words for meaning, but language is also dependent upon the unspoken. It is easy to maintain the standard by taking the meaning from the words and not the silences. Even as you read this are you listening to the words or to the silences? Reason, thinking about, seems to impel us to find meaning in the words, although we can also understand that meanings 'stand out' because of the background, because of the silence. This is to rationalize away the statement. We see its inner logic, yet it is at a superficial level only. We must seek more than its logic - we must seek its being and its otherness (its other-than-being). The trap of words can be malicious. To speak of words and silences is to already betray the project.

Music
Invents silence,
Architecture
Invents space.
Factories of air.
Silence
Is the space of music:
Space
Unextended:
There is no silence
Save in the mind.
Silence is an idea,
The idee fixe of music. ...

Silence is music
Music is not silence.
Nirvana is Samsara:
Samsara is not Nirvana.
Knowing is not knowing:
Recovering ignorance,
Knowledge of knowing. ...

Music is not silence:
It is not saying
What silence says,
It is saying
What it doesn't say.
Silence has no sense
Sense has no silence. ...

Excerpts from "On Reading John Cage",
by Octavio Paz, 1971, p. 121-126.

These excerpts illustrate Paz' insight into the limits of language. In the first stanza he uses music as an analogy to help us grasp his notion of silence. We are used to thinking of architecture as a science of shaping spaces. Paz takes us further; it not only shapes but in this shaping also defines or "invents" space. In a similar way music shapes and also "invents" the space of silence. The second stanza builds on our new knowledge and cautions us that

although music is what invents this space of silence, silence itself is music; and it is more. Paz is pointing to a new quality. In the same manner he is pointing to knowing and not knowing, where the latter is the higher form and inclusive form of the former.

In the last stanza Paz returns to silence and points out that in its essence, silence in its quietude, is **saying** what it does not speak. The last two lines are thrust out to the reader as a summation of the preceding section. This summation, however, adds a new twist which begs us to question; "Silence has no sense" (Silencio no tiene sentido); in its **saying** there is no tone of reason and no sensation. The vital point in the last line is that if sense (tone of reason and sensation) is ruled out of silence, how can we live in this **saying** of silence?

It has been easy to live with the **speaking** of words over the **saying** of silence for it comes with its own recompense which helps us to forget the greater possibility. The speaking of words, language, has become a substitute for communication (Latin communicare - to share). Instead of allowing an open sharing, a call to share, our language commands us to share. Somehow a sharing that is commanded is different. This speaking-of-words is then turned to re-define communication in terms which rule out that which

cannot be a part of it within this changed enterprise. We are left with a clear yet impoverished notion of both.

> What is there more mysterious than clarity? ... What more capricious than the way in which light and shade are distributed over hours and over men? Certain peoples lose themselves in their thoughts; but for us Greeks all things are forms. We retain only their relations; and enclosed as it were in the limpid day, Orpheuslike we build, by means of the word, temples of wisdom and science that may suffice for all reasonable creatures. This great art requires of us an admirably exact language. The very word that signifies language is also the name, with us for reason and calculation: a single word says these three things. For what is reason if not discourse itself, when the meanings of the terms are properly limited and assured of their permanence, and when these immutable meanings are fitted to one another, and combined clearly? And that is one and the same thing as calculation. (Valéry, 1956, p. 107)

We may take several biddings from this passage of Socrates. First, there are peoples who do not have the exactness of language that Greek has; that is, they cannot achieve such a clarity of articulation. In Greek, language, reason and

calculation work together to reach one end, to achieve this clarity. Socrates sees that these three elements are the tools by which we construct our art. And what if reason is discourse as Valery says? With what or whom is this discourse? What is it about?

Like the Greeks we, by living under the speaking of language (reason and calculation), live not directly in a naturally given world, but in one constructed; constructed in the manner in which a landscape on canvas is constructed. Yet we live within this construction and convince ourselves that, when we look off the canvas to the world, it is another constructed canvas. This work of art has its own structure built upon language, reason and calculation. Our challenge is to go beyond our self-painted canvas; all things from our perspective on the inside of the art are seen, defined and allowed to exist only in that they support the existing rules of that art. Somehow within the sanctioned sensing of shades and silences we must go beyond our construction.

The Watercolour

Here I see the work of Li Wô;
mist-ridden, searching cloud;
Absorbing pigment - pulling and pushing meaning;
**obscured** **revealed**
Here I see the words of I know not whom;
semidiaphanous, nebulous reason;
I close my eyes and allow the seeing;
**darkness** **light**
Here I see the calligraphic struggle of Teng Shih-ju;
blotted-elongated, rapid on white;
Fleeting strident shade, word is story;
**life** **death**

This dissertation is an attempt to get beyond the language we are presently caught within. In this attempt various reformulations are given. It is from these that the perturbations come. If they in some way offer insight into language, they are successful. The scope of this paper is to try and find "sign posts" or a way to find "sign posts". The test as to whether there is any success is whether any appear or seem ready to emerge.

The burden of "hard" data for the various reformulations lies beyond the scope of the present paper. After

there have been concrete signs, it will perhaps be time to go back and seek the confirmation demanded by "hard science". The two processes are not mutually exclusive although the latter must be the object of another paper. If no signs should appear, the merit of the work will lie in the exhaustiveness of the search and in the ability of the paper to co-author questions in the mind of the reader.

In the remaining pages of this chapter, I sketch the general direction I take in beginning my examination of language. As sketches, each holds a central area of interest which is to be pursued yet no single one is inclusive. In this way each is analogical to the whole. Given the parameters within each domain, the perspective and direction of this paper are briefly presented.

I am not offering forward a model. A model does not capture reality nor mirror it. A model reduces the features of reality to a manageable form to facilitate explanation and/or predication. (The qualitative interpretive models I have looked at are concrete instances of more abstract formal models.) That is not to say that the evidence here put forth (nor what is more likely, that the manner in which it is put forth) could not be used towards evaluating the merits of a particular model.

This dissertation is not a defense of Otherness and an attack on Being. In its formulation, it asks whether

propositions (that is, whether the stating of Being) form the barrier which forbids crossing over a line which Being seems to define. Otherness is used as an aid to help clarify (sensuate may be a better term in that clarify may already be saturated with tones from Ontology) this question.

If otherness is (or seems) to be the formulation of a super-ordinate theory, or another abstraction which includes Being, then the formulation fails [although this does not mean it is necessarily without value].

My starts and stops, my stretching and probing with and of language are a **strategy** of using the only available language while not subscribing to its premises.

## Three Themes

I now present three themes which recur throughout the paper. They represent a basic orientation to and from the material as well as offer up questions which will be dealt with. They do not represent an apriori condition so much as a continuing evolution of perspective which grows out of the writing of this paper. As such they were not written before hand with the hope of proving them. They are a part of the writing itself and change as the project continues.

1. In terms of law-ordering and classification and chaos and disorder:

This paper (arrives at)(sets out from) an epistemology of "spatialities" and "journeys" where new relations between people and world are yet to be forged. To know is to navigate between local fragments of space, that is, to reject generalities, classifications and the orderliness of law. It means to adopt the pluralistic epistemology of a journey; transport versus fixity.

> No, the real is not cut up into regular patterns, it is sporadic, spaces and times with straits and passes.... Therefore I assume there are fluctuating tatters; I am looking for the passage among these complicated cuttings. I believe, I see that the state of things consists of islands sown in archipelagoes on the noisy, poorly-understood disorder of the sea,...the emergence of sporadic rationalities that are not evidently nor easily linked. (Serres 1980, p. 18)

An emphasis of this type rules out neither complexity nor order although a new context may change the complexion of each.

2. In terms of Opening:

In the human world of perception there is what we are aware of and what we are not aware of; there is awareness

and unawareness. Both domains are vast. Is it or should it be our aim to make the latter into the former?

If the world consists of the known and the unknown do these two apparent opposites comprise the possible or experiential domain of experience? Have not the two notions ruled out the unknowable?

These three terms (known, unknown, unknowable) have come from living. In the first instance unknown was perhaps a subtle distinction of the known. It opened up a universe of thought (distanciated meaning) that was beyond articulation prior to the distinction, before the distanciation. One did not solely grow out of the other nor did they solely grow out of each other. The distinction made it possible to delve into a newly opened realm. However, it quickly becomes instituted in its own distancing; it becomes prescriptive. The universe which was opened up still remains open, however the essence of the opening [used as a verbal], which is the important aspect, becomes forgotten in a lust of techne; techne which is all that is left to carry out the probabilistic exploring of the universe.

To maintain the spark of an opening [verbal, that is, used as a noun and as a verb] is doubly difficult because the natural tendencies of words to distanciate and (self)-institute have been further supported by physical institutions in our present society. The separation has been instituted into our social system. I am attempting to

straddle language's own instituted functioning in order to allow sparks of opening to emerge.

3. Le quotidien nous en livre chaque jour les bribes. (Titus-Carmel 1978, p iv):

Our daily context is an extensive doctrinal system. With our present inscription into rationality, before we begin to examine alternatives which **quest**-ion rationality itself, the **quest** itself must first be legitimated by using arguments and proofs based on principles and procedures which are central to rationality itself.

As such there is a constant barrage of social and political persuasion which necessarily infiltrates the project. This unceasing prodding reaches to the depths of the formulator and of his or her formulations. The aim of the barrage is to convince the author of the folly and to encourage a change to a rational course. However, this is not always clear and as a method of last resort, the formulating [verbal, includes the formulator and the formulation] may be bought off.

## My Method

My method, in a manner of speaking, is **constitutive**. I speak now in reflection; reflected for the writing was the exploration, the point itself. When the writing stopped, an attempt to make sense or to search for guide posts was made

post-facto. With the post-facto work complete renewed searchings began. In one sense then this reflection is not really essential to what was written, for it was done only when the 'real' doing was stopped. In another sense, the reflection itself was an instant which was integrated into the next surge forward. The former is deceiving for it reduces the exploring experience; the accompanying sense is that what has now become manageable has incorporated the whole of the experience. The latter is deceiving for there is a tendency to think that the sign-posts which are placed (found) in these reflections are an essential part of the exploration. [This is only the case of my individual exploration. Different sign-posts may serve the same ends or the same sign-posts may serve different ends. Also, different signs will serve different individuals.]

The **constitutive** has been arrived at through and by the writing of this work. In that this paper has undergone significant change throughout its inception and explorations, the present notion which I have is a culmination of my journey. In that it obscures that journey itself, it deceives and misguides the reader.

What I call the **constitutive** is not apposed to "deconstructionism" in so much as the latter proposes to continually call into question the ground of being. In that the latter undercuts the pillar of appropriated meaning, the two bear resemblance. The **constitutive** also relies on that

uncharted area of human ability which grasps various tales (tails) of our endeavours, and with a sudden burst the woven fabric is thrust before our eyes before we were aware the weaving had even begun; the ultimate private form has already been constituted.

In an analogical manner, the body with its nutritive, chemical and biological elements produces a multifarious mound of contours on each finger which is private and original. In short, it is **constituted.** The element of the constitutive which I wish to highlight here is that which somehow works to create the ultimately individual. Does each process involve a catalogue of all previously created finger prints, for how else to assure that this one will be unique? Or is each production the result of a little understood law of the Uncertainty Principle? The element which achieves this 'miraculous' production is one aspect of what I have called the **constitutive.**

## CHAPTER II

### Servicing Language

A strategy is the effort of taking what is given and of marginalizing a previous probability in favour of a projection which questions both. The question, or the position which does this, yields a sign-post which is a memorial to the history of this new context as well as a signal of the unknown which lies ahead. The strategy stands as a relation, in the form of a question - of an opening, in which the conjunction of the contexts yields a sign-post.

A strategy is easily confused with an attack where the attack itself and the defeat of the opponent is the important thing. Here the strategy is an attempt to open, to lay bare as opposed to lay waste to. This is not an attempt to overthrow one view and replace it with another; nor is it an attempt to incorporate it into a larger whole. The strategy employed here is a way of having sign-posts show themselves.

How and where does language fit into a world which calls us; a calling which seems to grow ever more faint as we grow older, as we grow in and through language? The whole of this chapter is a strategy to explore the characteristics of language in the hope of shedding some

light on the above question. This strategy separates language into two major aspects: a) how language has developed in and with social structure; this I have called "subservience", and b) what structures are inherent to language and what is the resultant effect on individuals; this I have call "supraservience".

In every day living with language both, and perhaps other, aspects co-occur in various degrees in varying situations according to the individual. These two sections are a strategy to seek out sign-posts which may be highlighted in the perturbations which are bound to occur.

## Subservience

As an institution which has grown through a historical evolution, language belongs in certain historical traditions. From the time of Sir Francis Bacon, the predominating tradition in the Western world has been one concerned with differentiating and making things more exact. This use of the mind is said to provide us with knowledge. This knowledge then becomes the base of our power which is what gives us control over the external. Since that time our language has followed and evolved within this tradition.

The evolution of the term "logos" is a good example to illustrate the eventual subscription of language into the conceptual system, the system which predominates at present. At the time of the Homeric epics, logos (also lego, legein)

was used to refer to quite a different meaning.

> I know your valour and what you are, Why need you speak (legesthai) of it? If now beside the ships all the best of us were to assemble (legoimetha) ... (Homer, Lattimore trans., 1961, p. 278)

In this passage from the Iliad, we see that its first occurrence bears its familiar meaning, to speak. Lattimore has translated legoimetha as "to assemble" although it can also mean "to be gathered" or "to be collected". From this passage we see that the term logos serves two ends; it denotes both what gathers and what is gathered. It denotes the principle of the arrangement (the abstract) as well as the concrete things arranged. The idea of gathering has not been totally forgotten in modern English. It is still evident in the word antho-logy; a gathering together of the most beautiful flowers. Modern Greek still uses logos as the root for "gather" and "choose" (συλλεγο and διαλεγο). One of the strengths of logos is hidden in its ability to summon together things which lie in the masses.

At the time of Heracleitus the term "logos" was used to suggest a continuous path, in particular, to describe a long work or scroll which was just that. The style of writing in the original fragments which remain of Heracleitus, pointedly suggest that he was speaking in the role of a

prophet who had a specially inspired truth to manifest to his readers. This was common in his time.

> The following logos, ever true, men are found incapable of understanding, both before they hear it and when they once have heard it. For although all things take place in accordance with this logos, they seem like people of no experience, when they make experience of such words and deeds as I set forth, distinguishing each according to its nature and declaring how it is. But the rest of men do not know what they are doing after they have awakened, just as they forget what they do while they sleep.[2] (Diogenes Laertius, 1909, p. 44)

Heracleitus is attempting to suggest what the true nature of "words and deeds" is. He proclaims that all things take place according to this truth which he is asserting, yet men seem unable to understand it even after it is made explicit. He later points out that we should not look for analysis or elucidation in this logos for it is written in the style of the oracle.

> The Lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but indicates. (Fragment 93, Freeman 1971, p. 31)

In an oracle one attempts to express the whole and "indicate" or point out the truth.

While Heracleitus is concerned with pointing us to the

truth, in two places he issues warnings against "learning":

> Much learning does not teach one to have intelligence; for it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus. (Fragment 40, Freeman 1971, p. 27)
>
> Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, practised research most of all men, and making extracts from these treatises he compiled a wisdom of his own, an accumulation of learning, a harmful craft. (Fragment 129, Freeman 1971, p. 33)

Although almost contemporary with Heracleitus, perhaps only a quarter century later, it was the sophists who expanded the notion of logos to mean cosmic Law or reason. Protagoras is credited with being the first to say that there are two contradictory logoi or accounts about everything. This is really a formal expression of the Parmenidean doxa (appearance) which viewed the world of plurality and change in which people live as being set up by human cognition in a continually changing way. The two opposite logoi come from this cognizing. Aristotle[3] understands this to contain a denial of the first principle of demonstration, since it allows the same thing to be and not to be as it appears in opposite ways to different individuals. He also understands it to imply that things are perceptible only when they are actually being perceived

by the human senses. As a teacher, Protagoras is said to have taught the rhetorical and eristic art of making the weaker logos the stronger. That is, he could take the account or side of a case which appeared weaker, and he could make it appear the stronger of the two.

It seems to have been Antisthenes of Athens (See Owens 1959, p. 177) who countered the sophist doctrine of the two logoi. He developed the notion of a single logos for each thing by making every concept so self-contained that it could only be predicated of one thing. It would thus be the task of the wise to seek out this hidden ultimate law (law meaning more than 'rule' here).

In later Greek thought, in particular in the works of Plato and Aristotle, logos became associated with the operations of understanding, the orderliness of experience and the intelligent use of assertions. Over time the summoning power of logos most often came to be associated with language. After all it was logos in the form of discourse and language that enabled humanity to develop. In the Republic, for example, Plato recognizes language as the only proper vocation; dialektike (dia means through) literally through or by means of logos (legein). Reason, already a major component of the meaning of logos, became further incorporated into language so that dialektike was coming to mean reason through language.

With the new emphasis on language, the term logos

was adopted by theology. It quickly became associated with the word of God and evolved into The Word; the creative act of the Almighty.

Logos had become language; language which would serve a) to unlock the laws of the universe, and b) to unlock the spiritual laws which were to be lived. Living, following God's decree, and working - surviving by conquering nature - were accomplished through logos (language) which served the underlying power of the law, reason. Logos was thus ready for the development of an emerging interest in controlling the external. The development of scientific thought was to find a useful handmaiden in the following years.

Many of the historical meanings of logos are yet left as vestiges to modern society by the part they play in sustaining new usages of words. Logos is alive and well in modern Greek: λογος = speech; λογοδοσια = explanation or account; λεγο = say, tell or speak; συλλεγο = gather; διαλεγο = choose. The Greek radical occurs as the stem to such diverse English words as legal, legend, elect, intellect, collect, legislate.

The association of logos with reason changed the former from being a notion on its own (that of the cosmic Law in a unity of consequence and cause) to a notion such that it has been unable to shake its subservience to Reason. Logos has become the servant to reason. The manifestation of this

subservience is seen in the prominence of "ologies" in modern vocabularies; these are disciplines which can be brought into the light of reason through logos, through the word. The word works to bring out of experience that which reason can be applied to in order to discover the knowable. What is easy to miss in this development is that this knowledge is defined by the power of reason which has been curtailed (redefined) into a slave in order to proceed with the definition.

The quest of this paper, stated in terms of this brief sketch of logos, is to explore the originary experience in its fullness in which humanity held its first encounter with logos. With a re-discovered understanding of logos as a way of living there is at least hope that reason may re-admit itself into its own advent and become its own historical completion.

In this poem, histories of speaking and gathering are ghostly vestiges of a long tradition.

****legacy****

Supraservience

Vygotsky (1962) concluded that there was no specific interdependence between the genetic roots of thought and the word. However, there is a connection which originates,

changes and grows in the course of the evolution of thinking and speech.

By using word meaning as the unit of verbal thought, he was able to account for the developing change in word content as well as the way reality is generalized and reflected in a word.

> Word meanings are dynamic rather than static formations. They change also with the various ways in which thought functions.
>
> If word meanings change in their inner nature, then the relation of thought to word also changes (p. 124)

In order to investigate the dynamics of this relationship, Vygotsky re-examined the process of verbal thinking from the first appearances of thought to its formulation. He distinguished a meaningful, inner, semantic aspect of speech from a phonetic, external aspect. Although these are different they form a single unity and each has its own laws of development. External speech begins as one word and gradually progresses to more complex statements. The child starts with a part and moves to the whole. In internal speech, the child starts from the whole. It is a gradual process to master the various semantic units, meanings of words and to divide his formerly undifferentiated thought into those units.

Although thought and word do not follow the same path,

Vygotsky sees them as necessary elements for the other's development.

> A child's thought, precisely because it is born as a dim, amorphous whole, must find expression in a single word. ... Thought undergoes many changes as it turns into speech. It does not merely find expression in speech; it finds its reality. (p. 124)

What then is the developmental course which speech and thought follow? How does it take place? Both Vygotsky and Bain see the beginnings of inner and external speech in "that amorphous whole" where the child and adult are thrust into a social dynamic. From this social collective activity, egocentric speech begins to emerge along two separate paths. The path leading to inner speech evolves structural changes and becomes ever more truncated. Thus speech for oneself originates through differentiation from speech in the social world. On the other hand egocentric speech also becomes gradually more elaborated to serve external communication.

Socrates

> I told you that I was born <u>several</u> and that I died <u>one</u>. The child when it appears is a countless crowd, which life reduces soon enough to a single individual, the one who manifests himself and who

> dies. A multitude of Socrateses were born with me, from whom little by little the Socrates stood out who was destined for the magistrates and the hemlock. (Valéry 1956, p. 109-110)

Said in more elegant terms, Valéry seems to be pointing to the fact that it is only after experiencing life that one's self finally emerges from the social being he poetically labels the crowd. Vygotsky and Bain see this as taking place as the result of developing ability to manipulate symbols and an evolving differentiation of egocentric speech in an inner and outer form. Does growing through, by and into a system of language leave an indelible trace on impressionable young humans? That is,

a) As a result of this growth, what is the resulting human structuring which has taken place? One would not expect this to be a correlational effect but in more general terms, what is the structure which is placed on us as a result of our particular evolution with language?

b) Are there certain tendencies which are prevalent and which one would expect from an intimate association with language?

c) What are the prejudices and biases which are a part of this system, as they are a part of any system?

d) How does it orient us to problems, provide us with a built in frame of reference and stimulate certain types

of questions to the exclusion of others?

Whether the Sapir-Whorf proponents have anything to add at this point is debatable. They would suggest that the particular syntactical and other language specific properties play an important part in structuring the individual. In its strong form, this seems to certainly outstrip what we see, however, in a weaker case for propensities of individuals within a culture, one cannot definitively say. In any case this debate may be a moot point. It seems safe to say that symbol manipulation is important for assuring cognitive development. There may be a structural residue or implicitness from the particular language learnt; however it seems more likely that language in general has a more direct role. What is its implicit and explicit demand?

The following suggested answers are distilled from various authors and from the various professors I have dealt with. Perhaps more than others they reflect ideas in Luria, Vygotsky and Bain. These suggestions are not put forward as though they are invariant or as though they must, in principle, occur in every person, although they may. If they do occur, it is assumed that it will be in a context of interaction and development.

> Language does influence our cognition of reality, but it is doubtful whether it is a one to one correspondence. (Bain 1984, lecture)

The division of language into its immediately apparent Properties and associated Features is produced here as a strategic aid; an aid to help illuminate those elusive sign posts. The layout is not meant to be prescriptive but is a skeleton whose purpose is to scare out other hidden skeletons. In principle the formulation poses a question which we must consider if we are to explore ourselves.

The Properties listed on the following page I have considered essential to the functioning of language as we commonly use it today. These properties work together in different combinations and in differing degrees to give us the great variety of structures so common in our language. History has placed a greater emphasis on certain properties, and on certain features of these properties, to the exclusion of others. This process has left us with a particular image of language and certain social structures.

I have viewed the use of language to involve at least five major areas. These areas, which seem to describe the co-occurrence of the use of a word and various perspectives, I have called Properties. (The use of the labels and the term "Property" is a strategy to have sign-posts appear and should not be seen as a statement proposing categories.)

Although they appear to be distinct as they are presented here, in practice, they work together in greater or lesser degrees according to the individual and/or the social institutions bearing on the language at the time. Briefly, these are:

a) a Generalizing Property which arranges things and events in an ever higher order of inclusiveness.

b) an Instituting Property describes the tendency of words to self-reify. Words tend to become things and take on a life of their own. Further more, the process itself evolves its own momentum.

c) The Negative Property describes the use of language which helps us to seemingly deny the being of a thing; for example, red not red.

d) The Ordering Property describes the notion that by using words we string things and events into a linear picture which may or may not represent our experience.

e) The Gathering Property aims to include the notion that the use of a word focuses; it collects more or less overtly, certain elements of being. This implies that there is also an exclusion.

Some generalizing goes on in all language use. It is an action which separates (distances) us from the experiential milieu. Developmentally, it was the increased generalization within a social sphere which led to the separation of social speech and internal dialogue. As a mature adult, distanciation is but one feature in the complex use of language. At times distanciation acts like an essential property of language; at others as an optional choice. It is particularly a feature of scholarly work and, in general, it is an integral feature of reflective language. The integration of distanciation into a rule of generalization has been one of the contributing factors in the rise of science. Distanciation, however, is not equally present in all uses of language. One is minimally distanciated when engrossed in a novel, or when rapidly sketching down a spawning idea. In these cases the language has become a part of the participative event.

In attempting to understand the influence of the Instituting Property, it is not possible to separate out absolutely the social influence from the language influence. Suffice it to say that they are in a symbiotic relationship. In social speech word reification varies in degree according to the topic and the setting. It is essentially present through social cues such as in word-plays and in forms of humour which make processes and acts (especially sexual

acts) into objects. Word reification is also an integral part of archaisms and of words which have survived in slightly altered form. Although important, reification is not the dominating property of language in most social speech. In certain settings, however, this essential feature of the Instituting Property reaches its maximum development. In areas of medicine and scientific research, in particular, the word's most important function is considered to be **naming**; the ultimate reification. For a scientific community which was able to concentrate the Generalizing Property into a refined tool, naming has become a crucial adjunct and useful hand-maiden. Used together these first two Properties of Language have been redefined in a manner which rules out and confuses several Features of language.

It is a mistake to be taken with the naming aspect of words. The naming which takes place in science is an extreme case of **instituting** (of the Instituting Property). The structure and Property are sharpened to maximize the self-instituting and self-reifying tendencies of language. To further enshrine naming, social, physical and political institutions have been established which also support and encourage this naming. Naming is the extreme component of a reification that has instituted itself. As a property words do not name. This is not to say that there is no identifying or no labelling when we use language. There is

a natural aspect of logos which gathers. In this sense of gathering the word can be considered to identify or label. This is different than the identifying or labeling associated with naming. This will be more clearly explained in the next paragraph.

Another essential Property of language is to gather together various threads into a graspable unit. Words themselves focus. We must remember that the focusing, the focussed and what holds the two are aspects of a given meaning. Although at first this is easily confused with naming, the Gathering Property of itself does not bear the characteristic to move constantly toward instituting. The Gathering Property whimsically gathers and then gathers anew in free association. In identifying logos with language the Greeks made a fundamentally sound description of this one Property of language. In applying the notion of logos which was in use by the early Greeks, both the gathering and the gathered were assimilated into the word. This is an essential property of words; the gathering property of words. Through a historical evolution of use, two things happened which make the association of logos and the word less useful: a) the notion of logos has been narrowed to mean a summoning governed by law or reason, and b) logos was mistakenly seen as the only Property of language. From the perspective of this paper then, naming is a signal of a process gone awry, or at least a signal of a process gone to

an extreme. First, it suggests a place to begin questioning for there is a likelihood that it represents an excess within the language system. Secondly, it signals built in instituting within a largely opaque institution.

What I have called the Negating Property of Language is more oppressive when combined with other Properties or with social histories which have incorporated Negation into a formal structure. There is a tendency for it to be exclusive instead of inclusive; to exclude the possibility of what is beyond instead of seeing it as an aid to expand our vision. For example, in the case of being versus not being, we tend to forget to look for otherness or trace. Awareness of the role of Negating and of the formal properties into which it has been incorporated seem to be the best defense against inscription.

By using words in sentences we are left with a linear string. This I have call the Ordering Property. It appears as though we have little choice in this matter. It is thus important to determine whether the linearity is an attribute of what is being talked about or just of the language. The very nature of linearity makes it particularly unsuited to expressing experiential events or simultaneous wholes. While there are several strategies at the level of the sentence which can help draw attention to the fact that the linearity is not to be ascribed to the meaning, these are

not extremely effective in longer works. The one area which seems to have some success in overcoming this is poetry, where the structure (both syntactic and linear) is manipulated in order to convey the point; manipulated to go beyond the Ordering Property. Even in poetry, however, it is questionable how effective this is in long works.

These Properties with their corresponding features show that language is an integral element within the social system. Any structure in the social sphere will encourage or discourage a development within the natural tendencies of language. Of the five Properties, it is surprising to see how few contain absolute apriori structure with their use: a) an ordering which we can partially draw attention to; b) there must be some gathering, an inherent logos, at the word level, yet this can be in free association; c) some distanciation is entailed, yet this can be minimized by placing the language and the speaker within a participative event. When these or other features are formalized into social life and internalized into social history, the coercive structuring nature of language becomes much more pronounced.

It is through the use of symbols, largely of language, that the developing human distances him/herself from an engulfing social world and emerges into a self. The quest of this paper stated in terms of the supraservience of language is: How do we go beyond that which has brought us

into our own flourishing being? Symbols have pushed us into our being, yet we must now strive to attain ourselves by overcoming those same social symbols.

## Conclusion

I have attempted to sketch briefly how language, as we use it, in its enslavement to a system (in this case enslavement to reason although in other historical traditions it has served the mythic, the magical, etc.) and with what at this time seems to be its inherent characteristics, leads to a tyranny over the individual.

The strategy of separating the social aspects of language from its internal structure, has opened several options which have the potential to act as guide-markers in a quest to go beyond our language. First, where the proliferation of "ologies" represents a redefinition of "logos", we must ask what social structures, what political powers and what economies are served. As a corollary, how does this influence how people live in the world? Second, where particular properties of language impose their structure onto an individual's view of the world and of him or herself in the world, we should ask what alternate emphasis would enrich individual experiences.

The historical tradition which happens to predominate in modern western societies has placed an increasing

emphasis on language, systems of propositions and predication, and the political and social sanctioning of knowledge which accrues as a result of that emphasis. This takes place to the exclusion of other forms of knowledge and invalidates their investigation.

Can we, by looking at what language gives us in terms of supra and subservience, examine possibilities which cannot otherwise be seen within existing societally sanctioned knowledge? Can we use this same societally evolved language to point beyond itself?

## CHAPTER III

## STITUERE

Marcel Proust upon the taste of a madeleine dipped in his tea...

> immediately the old grey house on the street, where her room was (his aunt's), came ... to fuse itself with the little pavilion in the garden...; and with the house, the town, from morning to evening and for all time, the square where I was sent before lunch, the streets where I ran errands, ... all take on form and solidity, town and gardens, all have come out of my cup of tea. (vol 1, 1954, p. 44-48)

It is not possible to do justice to Proust's prior eruption of experience by simply analysing his language. To search within the talking or in the tea is to search in vain; possibility is the ground of each. The tea speaks yet the speaking rests on the possibility (not a noun) which is prior.

### Possibility and Stituere

In using the term possibility to point to a groundedness of being and otherness (other than being and

other than not-being), I have withheld it from definition. To define it would return[4] it to the realm of the instituted (stituere - to set up); to set it up on/in the principle which is already there. It is in the noun form that this notion of institute is most evident, 'the institute'. Yet stituere need not only be instituted. It can also be constituted; put together in that which is yours, private. To constitute the world is to give expression to one's self-possibility; it is not expression according to external principle. In a world where the tendency is to apply language to experience, it is easy for possibility to become probability. To live in a world of probability is to live in the instituted, for probability is that which is there already, by principle; it is the ground of being <u>already</u> articulated. That which could have been constituted is left merely to be instituted for the energy of being has already reached expression - the probable. The <u>call</u> of the world which is grounded in its possibility is now reduced to a <u>command</u> grounded in the instituted.

The instituted then proceeds to treat, to institute, its own history; history is our instituted form of what probably was. We then have an orientation to a world which defines itself as well as its own history. This orientation

> produces a table of diverse, complex probabilities, always bound to local circumstances, weighted with a coefficient of facticity ...(Merleau-Ponty, 1970, p. 44)

The "local circumstances" are bound to the defining principle of the instituting; in a similar manner, a question already prejudices a response. The coefficient represents the change or process by which the possibility has become probable in producing what is then regarded as fact. (The definition of fact is simply a re-affirmation of the instituting principle.)

> Thus the instituted subject exists between others and myself, between me and myself, like a hinge, the consequence and the guarantee of our belonging to a common world. (Merleau-Ponty, 1970, p. 40)

I interpret this to mean that the institution is a division of one's self and of the other so that there is an instituted self and an instituted other between self and other. It is in this instituted creation that the commonness of the world appears. It is the "institution", the principle, which as the hinge, predicates self, the other and our life in a common world. While the instituted perhaps makes our public lives a reality, it has also infiltrated our private lives. It is perhaps time to also heed the call of the world; time to explore the realm of the constituted in the context of what is human.

Instituted word meaning

The institution of language is itself a statement about what is exceptional and what is not exceptional; what is there by principle and what does not seem to follow principle. That is, language points not to the whole of experience but to the place where agreement may be found. To the extent that the common (non-exceptional; the instituted) characteristics 'stand out' thus consensus can be reached. That I can find these common characteristics is exceptional; exceptional because, of all the difference in the world, sameness, apparent harmony in a chaotic universe has been agreed upon. When I use the word I exploit this exceptionality, this sameness, this identity.

When I say that something is red or green, I am saying that I prefer to talk to its redness or greenness as opposed to the other colour characteristics. This is the non-exceptional - the rule of the institution. When I use the words I draw attention to that particular aspect. It should not be a statement to exclude the other qualities (of colour) which are exhibited. In that one colour gets its quality from the others, whether present or not present, the total visible spectrum is stated more or less overtly in a single statement of colour. I can draw attention to these other aspects as well, yet in the interest of self

maintenance, language tends to hide this. The "red" object is also describable in terms of its "blueness."

colour, **example one**

> The dives were shorter now, more suited to her breath-holding ability, and interspersed with periods of just floating on the surface, breathing through the snorkel and watching Antoine dive down past the steep cliff face of the reef. In this silent and hauntingly beautiful world, time seemed to lose meaning and words seemed to lose significance. **Pink, purple, indigo, silver, green** - the names seemed too pale to describe the coral castles. Drifts of many-hued fish floated by, and sunlight, catching on their scales, splintered into rainbows...

colour, **example two**

> This is the same description but the colours are made overt only through blue. I have changed only the colours.

> The dives were shorter now, more suited to her breath-holding ability, and interspersed with periods of just floating on the surface, breathing through the snorkel and watching Antoine dive down past the steep cliff face of the reef. In this silent and hauntingly beautiful world, time seemed

> to lose meaning and words seemed to lose significance. Words seemed almost too fleeting to describe the coral castles of the reef; **those with the slightest trace of delicate blue - softsubtle ... the blue we use with baby girls; Tyrian fringed and regal; opulent saturation of its total essence; showers of glimmering speckles obscuring the tone behind their brilliance; a hidden blue, searching for its fulfillment, like that of unripened fruit.** Drifts of many-hued fish floated by, and sunlight, catching on their scales, splintered into rainbows.

The description in the second paragraph signals only in relation to the colour blue. It is a different description, yet the scene described is the same. Aught it change as well? In a society which used only blue as its referent for all colours, the words elicit an agreed upon (non-exceptional) understanding, as does our use of various colour labels. What this example underscores is that the "agreed upons", the "non-exceptionals" are different. The one description implies the other, although the words a) detract from the whole gestalt, and b) render to the background its own implications in favour of non-exceptional meaning. This is more than a problem of quibbling over words. One may like to argue the case for the colour between blue and yellow, a bluish-yellow, as being another

possible lexical entry for "green". We can also really produce "reddish-yellow" by mixing red and yellow. Yet, when

> one sees the colour for "reddish-green" (that colour between red and green) we are not able to recognize immediately its "ishness". The problem calls up a

founding prejudice of the institution of language. (See Wittgenstein 1981, Second Edition, notes 315-371.)

Paul Valéry also issues us a caution lest we be caught in this web of language.

> The preexistence of words... restricts, in the germ itself (emphasis added), our mental production... shapes this thought more than it expresses it and even develops it in a different direction from the initial one (1976).

Further on he says that our nature leads us to believe that "what cannot be said, and well said, does not exist." Finally, in the abridgment of Judith Robinson:

> Men have infinitely more trust in ideas consecrated by language than those, often much more important that remain to be discovered above and beyond all familiar words. (1963)

As Homo Loquens, language holds a special place in our

lives, yet through use we easily become indoctrinated. Ideas are discovered, created and re-created into a new existence; one which is sometimes a miscreation, at other times it is a genuinely new symbolic form, but more typically a simple reinstitution of the old. From a perspective where such ideas are viewed through language these "experiences brutes" (literally unworked, primitive, vulgar) cannot be admitted directly. First they must be consecrated, consecrated by canonical law (the laws of language, both structural and historical). The price we sacramentarians pay is to mold brute experience into an historical edifice. The conditions for consecration then become the standard to which experiences must attest in order to be granted existence.

Beyond or Nowhere[5] (Readings which almost point a way out of stituere; Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas.)

In the works of Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas[6] I have seen the beginnings of a direction which may prove fruitful in the exploration of the calling of the world, of the eruption of Proust's experience in his cup of tea. This new direction offers the hope of going beyond the structures which language, through social institutions and its inherent properties, seems to dictate. The explorations in the works of these authors are sometimes more and sometimes less overtly expressed; however, I feel

that there is a glimpse of a path to our problem.

I take the notions crystallized in these works and within the larger context of the other two authors, develop their notions along the lines of this paper. In what immediately follows, I trace only that development which bears directly on the discussion in this paper. I have included information which may be necessary for a fuller understanding through a series of notes. This was done in order to maintain the central thrust and style of my writing. My intent is not to distort or hide the development in these works.

Saying. It is within the mystery of "saying" that one is appropriated to meaning; saying as a constant "coming into" (this also includes coming into something); saying which is not only "about" language but also "of" language in its essence. Concomitant with this appropriation of the coming into of saying is the demand of "coming into"; the claiming of its due; the carrying out of its authority. In the coming into of saying we live with an unhearable. The mystery of the saying is that, that which yields us meaning and also that which makes meaning unhearable.

To listen to the saying is not as easy as simply tuning in one's ears. Saying is experiential yet figurative and we must be wary of the pitfalls which prevent us from encountering the mystery. The language which we use is individual

as well as the result of a larger social history. These two factors influence how words speak, and, therefore, encourage or discourage whether "saying" becomes apparent. Heidegger counsels us to avoid the language of "scientific dissertation" because the movement to question, within the form itself, can easily **make-into-things.** This then hides the saying (I use the term saying to mean the possibility of all parts of speech, as a verb, as a noun, as an adjective, etc., as well as silence).

I: Speaking <u>about</u> language turns language almost inevitably into an object.

J: And then its reality vanishes. (1971,p. 50)

That is, once we are speaking <u>from</u> language we can only be caught in a reality where language has objects speak; objects can only speak <u>about</u> language. (It must be about it because it is the axiom which realizes the speaking-about.) This speaking about or from, precludes the whole of **SAYING** from "coming into"; precludes the **saying of** language because the speaking from, constructs a shield which places the rest of saying in the shadows.

In order to peer into this penumbra of saying we must look for the region where the essential being of saying is at home. Using language is a speaking, yet speaking almost always obscures saying. In a sense the speaking is **of** the saying - saying is the 'raison d'être' or the impulse which thrusts it forth, - as is the silence also **of** saying.

Yet, in normal habit the speaking quickly speaks **from** and this obscures both the speaking of and the silence of saying.

An Example: There is a painting-

i) there is a second painting which in its doing reaches to the originary impulse for the first painting;

ii) there is another second painting which stands as a painting about the first painting. This can be a variation on colour, form, theme, etc.

The first is an attempted speaking of; the second is a speaking about or **from**.

In our ordinary speaking, we usually hear only the speaking; that is, we take up a position above language; that is, there is only a speaking **from** language. Heidegger comments: "A speaking from could only be a dialogue." This form of dialogue leads to 'dialogue', "where the relation of the message and the message-bearer prevails" (1971, p. 51).[7]

In an originary notion of dialogue, dialogue is appropriated to saying; it is brought about by **SAYING**; it is **OF** language not solely about it.

This has radically changed our notion of dialogue - so much so that it becomes incorrect to say 'what dialogue is'. Our notion of dialogue has been de-institutionalized and is

constituted out of **saying.** Saying is elevated into the a priori condition of dialogue - perhaps more than "condition of" - **saying** in some sense is 'true' dialogue, or simply dialogue. To talk or write about, is to be caught often in language--detailing objects and we are left in our own "obnoxious chatter." Silence, too, as coming **of** saying can be authentic saying: **silent silence saying.**

Addressing the Beyond. I am able to address myself to that world which begins anew each morning as I open my eyes. (I wish to use the word **address** in its fullest sense, incorporating three shades of meaning; a) to direct my speech to; b) to direct as from my place of dwelling (both in and of the world); c) to direct my manner, my conduct.[8]) The tenor and flavour of this addressing unknowingly seep into the **aspects** of the faces and landscapes I see; also these same **aspected** faces and landscapes make me a certain manner of being a man, infused into life. This **address** is the place I inhabit in the world and where I show my self both in and of the world. (In Heidegger's terms it would be from and of the world.) Our address **situates** us within a "more muted relationship with the world" (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 35).[9] This address situates us in the "openness upon the world" which is beyond a reflective turn. Beyond in prior-ity (that is temporally prior) and also beyond in that an attempt to re-address the world through the

reflection makes it immediately into a different address. It is no longer prior but post.

> I should say that there was there a thing perceived and an openness upon this thing which the reflection has neutralized and transformed into perception-reflected-on and thing-perceived-within-a-perception-reflected-on. (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 38)

Merleau-Ponty sees this as pointing out the necessity of an operation other than the conversion to reflection (above called **address**), one more fundamental, a sort of "hyper-reflection (sur-reflexion)". The task of this addressing, of this hyper-reflection is to speak

> not according to the law of the word-meanings inherent in the given language, but with a perhaps difficult effort that uses the significations of words to express, beyond themselves, our mute contact with the things, when they are not yet said. (1968, p. 38)

The **address** is where we must seek the secret of our perceptual bond with the world in order to state, in words not according to their pre-established signification, an at least prelogical bond.

In order to address the things themselves, in order to avoid a designation which always ends in positivity, Merleau-Ponty first purifies theoretically the notion of "subjectivity." There is no-ego; no-consciousness without inhabitant. It is not the reverse of the body. It <u>is</u> the

void; it is nothing, nothingness which needs the plenitude of a world to bear its emptiness. The world on the other hand, as Being, is Absolute plenitude and positivity.

With me as negativity and the world as positivity we cannot interact. I go to meet a massive plenitude: between it and myself there is no point of encounter or of reflection. It is Being and I am nothing. I and It are absolutely foreign.

In attempting to use words to give us some idea of the Nothingness, yet at the same time trying to avoid it as an "object of thought", Merleau-Ponty suggests that nothingness is

> a lack of being, but at the same time a fissure that deepens in the exact measure that it is filled. (1968, p.53)

The 'thisness' which is before me, and which seems to stuff its mass into the void, can be sensible only if it is the nothing separating me from it. In as much as the mass is put before me the nothing that I am is determined.

As Nothing has no point of contact with Being, so Nothing has absolute contact with Nothing. Other ipse's (other For-itself's) are first seen but not contacted, for from my perspective they are seen **AS** the being which is situating around the fissure of Nothing, which they are. Yet where do I see other ipses's (other For Itself's)? In their Nothingness. It is not somewhere nor anywhere that I see Nothingness for that is where

Being, which I can never be, is.. I see nothingness, nowhere.

Merleau-Ponty sees our task to be to describe our relation to the world:

> not as an openness of nothingness upon being, but simply as openness: it is through openness that we will be able to understand being and nothingness, not through being and nothingness that we will be able to understand openness. (1968, p. 99)

This openness means that I visit Being in-itself. The distance, the fissure, which remains in front of me even in openness is because of nothingness. As I try to cross this distance so it is formed.

> The openness upon the world implies that the world be and remain a horizon, not because my vision would push the world back beyond itself, but because somehow he who sees it is of it and is in it. (1968, p. 100)

Thoughts are the vehicle of a relation to Being. The relation of Nothing to a situation and a body are a relation of Being.

In using the term "Nothingness", Merleau-Ponty was able to draw on the work of Sartre in "L'être et le néant". In an intuitive grasp, he was quick to realize the significance of this development and explored many of its possibilities, especially his critique of the restrictions of reflection.[10] This notion, however, contains two aspects which are easily confused. First, the notion of nothingness as absolute not-

Being; what is beyond. Second, that this can be glimpsed or in some way dealt with by applying the linguistic property of negation to Being. That is, we have both definition and attribution by way of negation.

It is by no means clear that this is or should be the case. This may have been one of the reasons that the insight seems to be lost later on in "The Visible and the Invisible". Towards the end of the section on Nothingness (1968, circa p. 64) Merleau-Ponty seems to have lost sight of his earlier cautions. He is slipping into, or at least leading the reader to slip into, an abyss of being which is a re-defining of "Nothing". Now the juxtapositioning of Being and Nothing seems to become the whole. In the confusion he seems to reconstruct the being/non-being dichotomy and return to the hold of being.

The cloudiness of expression leads to two different types of exploration. At times we wonder whether what is meant is simply "negativity", as he often slips into using this word. However, the aspect which does come through in places, is that Nothingness is not just negation, it is beyond Being. To reduce this notion to negation is to reduce nothingness to a shadow of Being. Nothingness on its own can have (not-have) its own characteristics (non-characteristics). The words belie the difficulty of language. The use of the negative is to point beyond, away from being,

not to the defining of nothingness in terms of negation. The task facing us now, is to search out ways of exploring this nothingness.

Otherness. For Levinas "transcendence is passing over to being's other, otherwise than being. Not to be otherwise, but otherwise than being"(1978,p.3). The statement of being's other, of the otherwise than being, claims to state a difference over and beyond that which separates being from nothingness - the very difference of the beyond, the difference of transcendence. This is a resurrection of one of the meanings of "nothingness" which Merleau-Ponty developed.[11]

I feel that it is a major contribution to return the notion of "nothingness" to a forum for thought. Not only has it returned, but it has been sharpened and focussed in the expression "Other than Being". In the brief discussion of Levinas which follows, I have dealt only with his work on "other than being" as it directly concerns language, in particular "saying". In this regard he shows strong agreement with Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger.[12]

> Is not the inescapable fate in which being immediately includes the statement of being's other not due to the hold the said has over the saying, to the oracle in which the said is immobilized? (1978, p. 5)

**Saying** is not a game. Saying is prior in time to the verbal signs it conjugates; it is prior to linguistic systems; it can be thought of as a foreword which comes before the text of languages. It is the original or better, the pre-original, what is put forth in the foreword. (Pre-original) **saying** sets forth an order more grave than being and antecedent to it. This is not to say that language is devoid of this pre-original saying.

> Pre-original saying does move into a language in which saying and said are correlative of one another, and the saying is subordinated to its theme. (Levinas 1981, p. 6)

In saying as said everything (Being) is put before us. By subordinating the saying to the said I have allowed expression in Being to burst forth. Behind every statement of being as being, the saying overflows the very being it thematizes in its stating.

Levinas points to Otherness, or beyond being, in terms of saying; a saying prior to language but without which no language as a transmission of messages would be possible. This is an attempt to point to a way of thinking and expression which sees beyond being and which does not reduce saying to said and all sense to interest. From this perspective, this paper is an attempt to apprehend otherness (other than being). Although hidden and, therefore, contextually altered in its reflection of the

conspicuousness of Being, Otherness is shown in Being.

> Language permits us to utter, be it by betrayal, this outside of Being, this ex-ception to being, as though being's other were an event of Being. (Levinas 1981, p. 6)

We seek otherness (otherwise than Being) yet as soon as it is conveyed before us, its manifestation in and by the said dominates the saying which is the force of the stating. This "otherness" is already in the saying which must be unsaid in order for the possibility of seeing it in the said to remain.

Although it is inconspicuous in the said, we begin our search at a place close to the fissure. In some 'word' we must seek an opening onto fissure; we will then be confronting the word in its saying with both its Being and otherness. We must seek the opening where the rightful power of saying exceeds the said.

In the works of these authors was an attempt to deal with an aspect of living, of experience which is not dealt with in the usual realm of ideas, reflection, etc. The same glimpse was manifested variously in the terms "Nothingness", "Saying" and "Other than Being". In these three terms we find another level of support for a new investigation into the call of the world. There are also suggestions,

almost exclusively in terms of what is not included in the notion, and cautions which may aid the quest. Towards otherness ...

# CHAPTER IV

# ANALEPTICS

## The Mark of Language

Growing through, by and into a system of language leaves an indelible trace on the developing cognitive structure of young humans. What does such a trace look like? In this regard our somewhat futile attempts to teach apes natural human language is illustrative.

Although there is no evidence to suggest that apes can learn natural human language, they have been able to learn how to manipulate a simplistic set of symbols. The interesting result was not an expected part of the language teaching program. It seems that language-trained apes exhibit a characteristic in Equivalent Matching which non language-trained apes do not exhibit (See Dr. David Primack). Specifically, the language trained apes were able to judge 1/2 an apple the same as 1/2 a cylinder of water; they also judged 2 balls the same as 2 chairs. While the non language-trained apes were able to match 1/2 an apple with another 1/2 of an apple or 1/2 a cylinder of water with another 1/2 cylinder of water, they were unable to perform correctly in the examples above. That is to say that the language-trained apes were able to make a judgement which

seemed to be based on a description of the object instead of solely on its appearance. It seems as though another level of distinction has been integrated into the cognitive functioning of these language-trained apes. This level of operation was not available to the non language-trained apes.

Our particular social structure rewards and in fact often only acknowledges actions which are based on decisions of language. Our tests of intelligence, the move up the social hierarchy, the development of trade and commerce and education in general are all based on a selective group of skills that require us to make judgments based on information which can only be gained by resorting to language. It often seems necessary to formulate things into language or they somehow remain not quite good enough. Words invite us to work and re-work. What we re-work is usually not the original impulse for the work but instead the worded, and thus changed, idea. Research then has a tendency to take on aspects of the symbols instead of aspects of the living being researched. Thus, we are quickly removed from the originary.

When we say something, when we speak or write words, we fall short of the experience we are expressing. The emphasis of our social structure encourages us to ignore this gap between the experience and the description. It encourages us to pursue only those things which have

resulted from and in the articulation.

It is a mistake to think that only the sense of the words is important. Since it is easy to confuse or integrate the notions of thought and language, the notion of what is behind the words, the possibility, is quickly forgotten. Do we not have at first a creative thought? It must be granted that as the thought progresses it is brought to fruition by and through language. The language has made the thought into something it would not have been (attribution of social structures, historical overtones, etc). This is not to say that it could come about without language. Although thought and language interweave and grow together, this does not mean that they are the same thing. To bring a new emphasis, a new awareness, to aspects of language will also have the thought develop in a different manner.

In forgetting, sacrificing the original creative spark to an expression steeped in social institutions, we see meaning as if it lay in the words. We come to rely on the words. In one sense this is true, for the words contain the social meaning which history and social structure encourage. That is, we are given an impoverished meaning which results from obscuring and then ignoring a part of one's fundamental roots.

That language can speak at all is because we speak not

only of what we know (that is we put on a verbal display) but because we also speak of what we do not know so that we may know it (because language in expressing itself is also partaking in its own ontogenesis). We can maximize this second feature of language (that is we can specifically dwell on it in order to focus ourselves to it, although the stranded significating must rest around it) by (a)voiding many of the words which contain what they say and by employing those that vibrate most resolutely at the edges, the horizon of Being. The first step is to use language in a way that allows us to take its power in order to allow us its **horizon** (in proximity to the fissure yet still within Being. To approach horizon is a strategy to pull at the vertices of Being.)

In realizing that language has these two aspects, telling us what already is and bringing to articulation what is yet to be, we are pointed towards a new domain in which we seek the fissure. In allowing a constituted language to speak we see that what is yet to "come into" is an integral feature of what already is. The extremity is not a distant horizon. Our being is not surrounded but rather traversed by its limit, marked in its interior by the multiple fissure.

In using these terms "fissure", "horizon" and "edge", we must acknowledge that each conveys but a portion of our sought after idea. When I am a) able to view the

fissure and b)able to peer into this fissure, the fissure dissipates before me; it is no longer what it was. The fissure is a manner of speaking which is a symptom of not being able to see it; it is an invisible referent which is inscribed with what we are presently seeing. Once the fissure becomes real (in its own terms, not by a series of definitions from a domain which excludes it) the ground from which it is viewed has also changed. In the respect that I am ever treading on newly discovered (created) ground, it is like a horizon; in that the ground I was on has itself changed, the old structures have fissured; in that one has the excitement of treading onto new soil, one feels as though walking a narrow edge.

> This, dear Phaedrus, is the most important point: no geometry without the word. Without it, figures are accidents, and neither make manifest nor serve the power of the mind. By it, the movements which beget figures are reduced to acts, and the acts being clearly designated by words, each figure is a proposition that can be combined with others; and we are able in this way, without paying any more heed to sight or movement, to recognize the properties of the combinations we have made; and as it were, to construct or enrich space, by means of well-linked sentences. (Valéry, 1956, p.105)

Dialogue

P: Where in the word which is spoken is the talked of dialogue? Where is the eye, the eye which sees and holds... What does it see?

D: It is the other, the otherness of being, the "di" of dialogue, that it holds - grasps onto and draws into the whole. It is in this grasping and holding made possible by the eye that enters us into the dialogue.

P: Yes, I see; and what is the handshake without the eye but a hollow-grasping, a clutching at what is not clutching you - a shaking of a hand **hand shake** not a hand-shake. It is the eye which makes the holding a meeting of the two. **hand-shake** This is what the - (hyphen) in handshake means; uniting that which was separate. **handshake** Yet we traditionally do more than put the two side by side, we unify the two with the hyphen; we do more, we make the unity a new whole, handshake.

D: So..., the eye unifies the two, not as two put together, but as one. The dialogue established by that of the eye is a speaking of the two as one and more; a beyond-speaking; a **saying**; a **seeing**. The "di" is a historical vestige of rootedness in the two; the trace of originary impulse.

P: Then it is with the aid of the eye that "di" becomes a "sign post" from history.

D: The "di" refers to that dialogue which is almost, but never quite forgotten in (its own) otherness. In the **speaking** of words we can only di logue, or at best di-logue.[13]

It is strange [perhaps a feeling similar to standing at the edge of a precipice and peering into the abyss] that it can be the eye which incites the speaking to relinquish its hold in favour of **saying**. Close your eyes at the cliff's edge and the world steadies. The familiar speaking returns to quiet what is. Open your eyes and in the brief glimpse, **seeing** leaves a vertiginous assault on the senses. The feeling of **seeing** becomes physical.

At the level of spoken words, dialogue is physical; controlled pushing and pulling of air, tightening of the muscles, etc. Following a scientific tradition, it seems that this physicalness is a process used to overcome the problem of noise. Noise is a set of phenomena of interference which become obstacles to communication. This is the case in two senses. The words must be formed well enough following formal properties so that they can be recognized. Second, there is the background "noise" against which the communication takes place.

In terms of the larger discussion of this paper, this first property is accidental and the latter is essential to dialogue. Dialogue necessitates two seemingly contradictory presences. First, there is a background noise against which a message takes shape. Second, it seems to require the exclusion of what it needs to include, the background noise, in order to succeed.

Noise is what interferes and thus breaks down the communication. In its historical beginning "noise" has been that which breaks down the established systematic usual state of things. The word is descended from the Latin "nausea", which is a break down in the normal state of the body. In dialogue, noise breaks the power of instituting. If we then retire from the dialogue and leave it at a state of noise, however, we have gone only half way. The bond of instituere has been broken, yet nothing has been put forth. It is out of the noise that possibility is returned to itself and that a free constituting can take place. We can illustrate this by looking at two different instances of noise.

In the first instance we see that the two interlocutors unite to battle against the background noise. What is contained in this noise, is the power to break the instituting of the communication. The interlocutors' union is a battle to maintain "instituting" and is therefore

against "noise" which would break the union and re-call possibility. If in dialogue the two interlocutors battle against noise, we see the ultimate expression of Being, against, yet resting upon otherness. It is the two, in their bursting forth into being, thrusting forward from and of otherness; in this bursting forth the two in their meeting in dialogue battle against the ground, otherness. Therefore the two, in this dialogue, presuppose a third which is opposing. In order to decide the difference between the message and the noise, there is an alliance of the two against the one. The third (otherness) is thus responsible for both the noise and the communication. The alliance of the two, which is the instituting, fight their own ground.

In the second instance the interlocutors may unite with the noise (instead of breaching and suppressing the noise, they form a union with noise and come from it). To do this is to found a dialogue on possibility over against instituting. The dialogue where the interlocutors and noise unite is a union which works against "instituting"; if dialogue results it must be constituted. Otherness is returned to a position beside (through) Being. The co-presence of the two encourage the dialogue to become a constant "coming into".

Where in the word which is written is the talked of

dialogue? Dialogue comes through the eye - the eye that grasps and holds the other. This is the confusion, for at first glance, the place looks the same. The words are one, the one looked at by the eye. Yet in the looking, the look obscures the **seeing** in the same way that the speaking obscures the **saying**.

In the written word, what looks back? Where is the eye of the other which allows **saying** to burst forth. The other, the word, sees not, it has no eyes; yet the possibility of the other which sees is the foundation of the union of the two. Here the eye exposes the book for that which it Is; it is that which cannot see. Impoverished for/by its lack of sight the book cannot enter into that which is founded on seeing, the dialogue.

I lend my eyes to the words. Now the words see; now they can found dialogue. Yet the eyes face outwards, they face one direction. In order to found the dialogue with the loaned sight which I have given the words, the eyes must seek otherness, beyond yet **of** and **from** the words. Through my borrowed eyes, which are looking at me **from** and **of** the words, the bearing of otherness becomes a possibility. Possible because it is yielded through the **saying** of the borrowed eye. It is <u>my</u> otherness which my borrowed sight exposes. Through the words the **seeing** of my borrowed sight encourages **saying** to cede <u>my</u> otherness.

From this digression into dialogue, we have found at least two sign posts which help us to look further. One was "di", showing a historical rootedness of union and the second was in being able to see "noise" as a place of constituting.

Bracketing

How does life, in its pre-original world, inscribe itself through words into being? That is, where in words can one see the trace of other-ness which results from its inscription into being?

At First Glance:

words are borne on a bracketing of the world; a bracketing which is silent and hidden yet which is as much a part of the word as each letter.

Words fall outside, are bracketed out of the world. )The brackets fall on the outer sides. Yet each word is( ()bracketed() by the space before and after which is "the support"()which()holds()the()word()in()place. [Bracket: from Bragget meaning to bear up; as a noun it is a support consisting of two pieces joined at an angle.] This suggests that the supporting, what is bearing up is essential to the

word. The () bracketing is as much the word as are the letters. By beginning at a particular )word(, which we must do to use language, we introduce a logical structure (()()), various layers of embedded brackets (supports), which are an arranging according to form. As an integral part of the )word( the bracket which puts itself outside, is also that which includes the other word. It is that which signals the relation, be it in formal terms, of the word which precedes or follows. In a text, the taken-for-granted bracketing, and therefore, the 'hidden' embedding of a form, are slipped by us in the guise of spaces; in the guise of what is not there.

On still another level, each letter

)()l()e()t()t()e()r((

is bracketed, borne up, by the space which is between, yet a part of each letter. Visually, the form introduced by the bearing up of words but hidden by the spaces can be represented in compounded form as:

)(()()()(()())

It is interesting to note that i) no matter where you begin or end you always have a series of logically embedded forms, and that ii) no matter where one begins, the form always calls for information from before, from outside of the text.

Our notion of this bracketing is further accentuated by the means we have devised to manipulate its internal structure. In particular, our notions of agglutination are

a powerful way of working with the hidden structure: for example hyphens, prefixes, suffixes, brackets, etc.

)()()())-(()()())(((()-()()))

In the same way when we talk, we bracket the world with our words. The brackets are the inner and outer puffs of air which are the cushion, the walls which keep us out yet which keep us in. It is these puffs between the words which bear forth the meaning. The space, the puff of air, is a bracketing-out of the saying of silence which leaves its trace as what allows words Being. Between the outer edge of the brackets of silence, the word is squeezed out of the fissure and is oozed into being. Our words are detours of **saying** which goes on in but is hidden by the bracketing.

The bracketing connects us to a world in a linear fashion. The word, on a perhaps microscopic scale, is dimensional as well. What is this "bracketing" which adds the dimension of depth to our words? It is that which the eye or ear meets before and/or after the word itself. That is a very linear representation and may be more figurative than real. It is more that the word is focussed out of a foreground and a background.

What is this grounding (fore and back)? In submitting "written" material, we often type black on white. Is this not already a "bracketing"? Does this background of the

white paper not focus the words themselves. A work submitted on rough newsprint, white "Classic Laid" or hot pink velum is certainly reviewed with a different eye. The fact that each of these is readily placed into categories of "appropriate" or "inappropriate", suggests that our words are indeed bracketed dimensionally but that we are often unaware of it.

The standard in academic circles is black on white; white of a certain size. This uniformity of background is an explicit rendering of an instituion which has evolved a hierarchy of importance and power based on an exegetical examination of a text. The result is to minimize word dimensionality. To the extent that we are largely oblivious to it and that we can quickly raise "institutional" arguments as to why it should be thus, we maximize uniformity of exegesis and thus confirm the instituting. (Non-conformity to the rule of minimizing this dimension of writing is often most prolific in first and second year students.)

We have an attendant action for foregrounding the writing as well. Derrida[14] formalizes this in his notion of "smearing". By writing with the smear, or by writing "sous rature" [translated by Spivak 1974 as "under erasure"] Derrida leaves us with a text which has words which are crossed out. The text contains the word , the deleting - the crossing out, and the replacement. This is to reflect

the turns of the word: a) since it is inaccurate it must be crossed out; b) since it is necessary it remains legible.

The physicalness of the smearing also adds another dimension. The smearing reflects the act of the writing (for writing is a smearing of sorts), and thus perhaps some hint of what is beyond writing as well. Perhaps there are an exceptional few who do not write through constant erasure, but for the most of us, this erasure, this smearing - crossing out, is a central feature of much of our writing. (That is, writing as opposed to copying, as many are wont to do.) Yet, our final "product" is a disavowal of this feature of writing. If language is an essential relationship with Being, does crossing out or smearing not signal a change in that essence, in that relationship? Hidden in the non-smeared work is a prescription which also hides the creative process itself. The un-erased work is a deception through system to reduce the dimensionality of a work which grew from an individual; a deception which prevents the dimensionality from being incorporated into the institution.

The un-smeared work is the signal we pass off as nothing, but this signal is also the greatest insult. It is an insult to the writer as it seems that this necessary part of the writing is unworthy and must be concealed; it is an insult to the reader, for s/he must accept a flattened and partially naked text. Only in terms of posthumous works,

once written by those now considered great, can we see the starts, re-starts and crossing outs of writing in creation. One must be dead to admit such folly, such depth.

The white background and the invisible foreground are the dimensional bracketing long ago taken over by an institution. The original smeared-smearing of writing is written by writing itself; the unsmeared-smearing of writing is written through the institution. The not smeared smearing, the not smeared writing, is a bracketing which embeds the writer and the reader into an institution.

Nowhere: (see the title of the section on page 48) (This section is parenthetical to the preceding one on Bracketing) The internal bracketing (the spaces between the letters which have squeezed saying into Being) do not exhaust the word's speaking. The internal brackets assure its manifestation in Being - inscribe it according to form and do little more.

There are other dimensions which take and inscribe the word and make it an instituted word. The instituted meaning seems to be no-where: a) a negation of the place, the negative of what is yet still inscribed within Being in the way that non-being is a part of being; b) a non-place in Nothingness, it does not reside in either Being or non-being.

In its not-instituted form, that is in its constituting,

the dialectic of the bracketed form allows us a meaning of now-here. The question the constituted meaning raises is: Does the meaning of "now-here", as dialectic of the instituted form, remain a possibility for both meanings 'a' and 'b' above? Is it a double dialectic? A correlative question is whether in the constituted meaning the single notion of 'now-here' can remain dialectic, at the same time, to the two instituted meanings.

The writing of this paper has so far marked out several areas which have proved fruitful in my quest into language. The sign posts which appear have been fleeting and depended as much on the question-asked as from where a question sprang. Still, certain paths have come into view.

It seems safe to say that our particular use of language has been conscripted into a set of social institutions which reward the search for a reasoned questioning. As these social institutions are an important aspect of an individual's growth, so they are mirrored in a re-created form in the person. There is an ordering, gathering and distanciation inherent in the use of our words. Although one can draw attention to these or minimize their subliminal structuring, they are also integrated into the larger social framework as well as into the personal history of individuals. These developments emphasize some aspects to the exclusion of others. Language gives the

language user a level of information which is not available to the non-language user. In this way it is like an extra sense. This aspect is easily incorporated into the preceding characteristics.

While the paper has brought to light the above notions, it is hoped that the particular structures and topics which have been discussed, in and of themselves (that is, beyond what the words obviously say) say something to each point. The paper as a whole is an analogy to the project as each section is to the paper. As the topics and themes have progressed, hopefully they have incorporated each successive stage into their structure and their themes. It follows that this Fourth Chapter has incorporated as much of the whole as any part to a whole is capable of doing.

The preceding chapters are the fence of zig zagging posts I have travelled. Now at the end of the fourth chapter, while perhaps the search for the next sign-post has not been exhaustive, it seems that I am ready for another type of search, one which is qualitatively different, yet one which also shares many similarities with the preceding one. Instead of seeking ever more sign-posts, the time is ripe to cross the fence; slide under, jump over or pry open a fissure and slip into the other side.

The searching itself, by reaching (creating) each sign-post has restored my hearing. The search itself has been

analeptic and restored the "calling" the "coming into". What is next is to carry the birth which has been kindled in and by the search ...

# CHAPTER V

# PALINGENESIS

This chapter is that emerging new birth and as such is struggling to take each new step. It is an attempt to grow into and out of a set of social structures formed with our new language. These forms must consider all of the previously mentioned properties and features.

The writing is an attempt to take the reader to the horizon, to the limits of Being as expressed in and of language. Yet that horizon is only the beginning. The aim is to go beyond that horizon in the co-authoring of the reader.

## At the Fissure.

Sometimes I write an esthetically, structurally pleasing and succinct sentence. The structure and flow of the sentence fit the idea I wish to convey and seem to reflect the idea of the whole paragraph. Yet, there is one word on which I am stuck. It does not say the exact shades of meanings I seek. I try the thesaurus, the dictionary, friends; at last, for lack of time or lack of patience, or perhaps because no such word exists in English, I abandon my search.

To abandon the search for the word is not to abandon the search to express that meaning. I reluctantly give up my "pleasing structure" and reword it into several sentences. I now express the ideas I wanted, yet in a rather unpleasing, awkward, structure. It is in this awkwardness of reformulated structure and those sought after meanings that the fissure lies. For example, is there a word which can adequately convey that a part is to a whole and yet still contains a notion of how it is a distortion; is there a word which adequately conveys the parts of three words, fissure, horizon and edge, expressed on page 60?

Two methods immediately come to mind in an attempt to come up with such a word. The first is to seek a clue to redefined meaning in a word's history; seek its etymology. The second would be to include a word's history in formulating a new meaning.

In working with our old language, our resources possess us in as much as we possess them. In searching an older, "now obscure memorial", I seek to shake the relation of the word to me; it must not be understood as an attempt to again institute lost meaning. In the process of opening a path to a past, I hope to throw open and lay-bare the relationship; the meanings are accidental in that they are not the aim; the meanings may be a medium which leads to the laying bare. In returning to etymologies, I run the risk of instituting

new meaning or of instituting the process of researching etymological roots. As soon as either of these takes place, the task has lost its vision.

We must be cautious of the word which speaks from the past. The past is with us but as now. It is not what it was just as the I that was is not the I that is. ----- I see the arrow in the hall, it is pointing the way. This once stone, this once iron thing,

> an inescapable and fatal projectile that pierced the flesh of men and of lions and clouded the sun at Thermopylae and gave Harold Sigurdarson six feet of English earth forever. (Borges, 1964, p. 41)

And what did those amazing Greeks really use the arrows for? **Shall I debase the past and also the present?**

To make(-)up (colour over, change the appearance of, put a new face on) a new word is not to contrive; it is to attempt to open a light onto that same relationship - the relation of word and man. Yet, to formulate this new word is to run the risk of forgetting the problem or believing it solved. It is not the act of making up the word which is important; it is whether the meaning is an "opening onto"; whether it captures the essence of "coming into" in its form as verb, as noun and the impulse for the coming.

In drawing attention to how using etymologies and

making new words may help or hinder our project, I have also done (said) much more. The structure of the institution has again crept beneath the words. While seemingly permitting my caution against the words, the role of the institution has established itself in my speaking. It is in the quotation.

When we use words to import their historical vestige, these newly used words are but the wake of what was already. In so much as we install the wake we also, in a sense, de-originate our own uttering (utterance). An example of this is the use of a quotation. At one and the same time the quotation helps to achieve a stating, and by and in the stating it achieves an instituting. I attempt to slide behind a past and partially disclaim the creation, the creative use of my words. By quoting I deny that the work has **come** (into) from me. This must not be confused with saying "it is mine". Authorship and ownership differ in quality. To author is to articulate a creative impulse which "comes into" from oneself; we are surrounded and made up of the world we live in and thus in a sense the creative impulse is a culmination of that world - this is not to say that the creative spark did not occur in me. Ownership is a political-economic statement sanctioned by certain social institutions. To cite a quotation does at least two things immediately:

a) as a social rationality it is a disavowal of my creative impulse in my work;
b) it is a social statement which rationalizes, politicizes and justifies ownership.

Within these cautions lie the "spark" which is reason enough for the attempt. Each caution in itself is a way of pointing toward a horizon, out of which an "opening onto" may emerge. Once we begin to approach the horizon we feel movement. We sense the opening, yet it is a mastery of seeing to be able to hold it; too much attention and it will vanish; too little attention and it will vanish. To approach horizon but to mistake it for the thing is to pass it by.

In one's absolute proximity to horizon is the maximum extent of being. The horizon (the horizontal dimensioning of being) has pulled taut, to the point of breaking, the vertices of being (the vertical dimensioning of being). Each vertex tends toward centrality, dense unity. (In this respect the horizon provides a unique perspective to view and reflect on being. However, it does not go beyond being.)

To reach horizon and peer into opening is not enough, for both lie within being; neither is beyond. Imagine that in chasing the end of the rainbow you accidentally succeed; you find yourself surrounded by colour, each one basking

around you, enveloping you; the moment is exquisite; suddenly you **look** and it is again distant. In the enveloping, opening was not a thing. The enveloping of colours was going beyond opening to "openness". The enveloping was going beyond horizon. In the moment that the rainbow returned to the distance, horizon was returned to its essence, which is being. What is (is-not) this "spark"?

In articulating the word I am seeking, I run the risk of sacrificing (hiding) the original creative spark which does not lie within the institution. Thus when I use a term to articulate the nuances which the terms fissure, edge and horizon only partially articulate, I run the risk of making it seem like a thing; or of having it look as though it has been described - what is described is an impoverished notion; an impoverished notion which seems to account for being only; a notion which risks becoming its own institution.

So it is with relief and reluctance that I put forth the term **azimuth**, a word which already has a history but one which is to be modified for use here. The term itself is but another sign-post, but since it is the first such sign since having crossed the fence, at the moment it takes on greater significance. It is no more nor no less important than the others. The **azimuth of language** is the arc which traces a movement from being to otherness. From within being it shows itself at the horizon between the meridian of a place (a social institution) and a vertical

circle passing through language. The word azimuth seems appropriate for several reasons. It includes the idea that there is an integral social and also historical component. These components may change to any number of positions and it is the conjunction of these components with language which results in a glimpse of the azimuth. Two other crucial aspects are also included; from any given point there is always a horizon and a movement. An arc combines the notion of a "part of that horizon" and also a notion of a sudden jumping or crossing over, a sudden "luminous discharge". To the azimuth of language ...

## The Azimuth of Language

What follows is the opportunity to gaze into an opening, a fissure from a writing which forms a conjunction with an instituted form. The conjunction is as dependent on the position of the co-author-reader, as of the original writing of Barthes (taken from Empire of Signs, 1982, p. 15-18). I have reproduced the larger part of the work. Immediately beside his work I have produced a response. It asks and re-asks many of the same questions as the original, yet its meaning, because it is beside, is not the same. The task of the work beside is other than the task of the original. Placing beside is a strategy; a strategy which counters a co-authoring which may weave meaning from

Barthes' words in Chopsticks.

A strategy illustrates conjunctions of compatibility. It shows that notions or ideas may easily fall into proximity or align themselves along certain axes. Thus compatibilities tell us not so much about essential properties, but point out "thought of" structures which draw or exclude properties into themselves. The strategy shows that compatible is a statement of rule.

The strategy charges the co-author-reader; it has words rush upon the reader and saturate a context over a founding of meaning based solely on words. As a strategy, the text beside, is the charge (as a charge to a jury) delivered in participative solemnity. It aims to shuffle the reader between his words, to a silence which may allow the azimuth to appear.

Chopsticks

The foodstuffs are cut up so they can be grasped by the sticks, but also the chopsticks exist because the foodstuffs are cut into small pieces: one and the same movement, one and the same form transcends the substance and

The knife and the Fork

The fork gently cradles the peas; it glides beneath, never exerting a force that would bruise the delicate skin or have the center squirt forth. The knife, sure - guiding and firm, is used to steady the peas, prepare them for a

its utensil: division.

Chopsticks have other functions besides carrying the food from the plate to the mouth (indeed, that is the least pertinent one, since it is also the function of fingers and forks), and these functions are especially theirs. First of all, a chopstick- as its shape sufficiently indicates- has a deictic function: it points to the food, designates the fragment, brings into existence by the very gesture of choice, which is the index; but thereby, instead of ingestion following a kind of mechanical sequence, in which one would be limited to swallowing little by little the parts of one and the same dish, the chopstick, designating what it selects (and thus selecting there and then <u>this</u> and not gentle ride. The ride, the transfer, begins.

There is no hesitant moment of wonder as each pea rests comfortablly and is delivered to the mouth; no sudden straining lurch of the neck at the last instant as it approaches. The peas have been prepared and arrive safe and intact, ripe for plucking into the mouth. Neither is there a need to vulgarize the transport by carrying the container to the mouth; the food is what we seek.

The knife and fork, instead of a designated pointing, scan the plate as a horizon; an arc is defined by a new conjunction, and the knife and the fork as one, reach forth and coax the food forth - and more, they choose how much is to be brought forth. Eating with a knife and

that), introduces into the use of food not an order but a caprice, a certain indolence: in any case, an intelligent and no longer mechanical operation. Another function of the two chopsticks together, that of pinching the fragment of food (and no longer piercing it, as our forks do); to pinch, moreover, is too strong a word. ... in the gesture of chopsticks, further softened by their substance - wood or lacquer - there is something maternal, the same precisely measured care taken in moving a child; a force... no longer a pulsion; here we have a whole demeanor with regard to food; this is seen clearly in the cook's long chops sticks, which serve not for eating but for preparing foodstuffs: the fork is the art of conjunction where the two as one shape and bring forth what was hidden in the larger form.

In selecting and shaping (carving) one ingests the very art which is introduced little by little, in reciprocal to, what is before the eye. In this shaping one is not bound to a pacified acceptance; choice can involve the dart of the fork to hold and fasten securely while the other works to bring out the hidden essential form, both on the plate and in its nutritive essence.

In this gesture of carving is the remembrance of original procurance; of the fact that food must be gotten, it does not give itself. The fork and knife replay the primal struggle of life before us.

instrument never pierces, cuts, or slits, never wounds but only selects, turns, shifts. For the chopsticks (third function) in order to divide, must separate, part, peck, instead of cutting and piercing in the manner of our implements; they never violate the foodstuff: either they gradually unravel it .. or else prod it into separate pieces..., thereby rediscovering the natural fissures of the substance.... Finally, and this is perhaps their loveliest function, the chopsticks transfer the food, either crossed like two hands, a support and no longer a pincers, they slide under the clump of rice and raise it to the diner's mouth, or... they push the alimentary snow from bowl to lips in the manner of a scoop. ...by chopsticks,

There is no forgotten suppliance buried behind a lust of glutinous nutritive indulgence. Each shaping stroke re-invokes the act; each bringing to the mouth relives the sacredness of the sacrifice.

These utensils in their materiality, represent the eaters; it is not an eagle or a cougar which portions this feast. The knife and fork: stainless steel; brass with rosewood craftily molded into a grip; nickel with inlaid Pearl and ivory: - from the world and also of it. This is our special relationship.

It is this unequalled relationship which plays upon our table; between what is of the world and what is in the world; both meet (dual) before my eyes. The game is won, or so it seems, by man. Then

food becomes no longer a prey to which one does violence ..., but a substance harmoniously transferred; the sudden coup, the ultimate victory, the food slips away from both into the gullet; the sign that we too are ultimately of the world.

In the case of the Barthes' emotive description, we are at first struck by a description of an act in which we have often participated but never reflected upon. Secondly, we are left with a feeling of the experiential excellence of the chopsticks; also at how vulgar our own history is which is incorporated into our eating utensils. For us to sit back and only admire this insightful description from Barthes, is to fail to slip into the fissure which has been opened; opened through a writing which strikes at our history and social structures. To remain at a position of admiration is to reinstate the institution which was fissured; the new institution is supported by the awe and credulity of the writing and reaffirms the faith in the instituted project.

The same fissure encourages us to remember that the chopsticks themselves are their own instituted form, they hide the cleaver. The dainty and beautiful arrangements, which also are a part of the chopsticks, are the supplication of the completed sacrifice carried out by the hidden

cleaver. These cutters, sorters and arrangers which are not seen, do half my eating before I have even seen my food; is it any wonder it is so dainty. These chopsticks, in that they "exist because the foodstuffs are cut into small pieces", deprive me of part of my eating, deprive me of my original procuring of the food I eat. My eating is made a play in which I have but a small part.

How does this tone, a tenor of our history, slip between the words and question the reader? Within its quest, the question which is never stated is asked of the reader. The words and tones question the actions of the reader, what is eating?, and what of the eating is ritual? Through Barthes' writing, we are gathered around the notion of "eating", a primordial action; the gathering itself is constructed as a questioning of our "ties" to our procuring and our nutrition. Although it is related to us in an exciting discovery of Japanese cuisine, the passage carries the weight of our (and their) whole history bound in gestures towards our food.

At the precision of isolating a) awe at the words, b) the way the Japanese eat, and c) how we institutionalize our eating, there is a possibility of a verdant blooming. The <u>opportunity</u> is to nurture the bloom within a new opening (this opening is supported and created by "openness" which the conjunction described above has encouraged to

expression). The temptation is to dwell within a glory bound in words; openness is then choked and disappears. There is also a second temptation lurking effervescently in front of the conjoining; that is the "opening" itself. At the moment of conjunction, horizon looms and manifests itself as opening. This opening is the farthest extremity of Being (of the eating).

This horizon, the opening, the horizontal, has pulled the vertices, the vertical, of Being to the farthest extremities of probability. At this extremity, which is not at the periphery but which traverses, one can glance back into being; the traverse itself is a new context yet is still within Being. Therefore, to remain at the opening is to await the tendencies of being towards institutionalization. This may be through reification, social structure, through language, etc. The inevitable result will be that both azimuth and possibility will be lost; we will be returned to horizon and probability.

The challenge of the conjunction which Barthes has encouraged, is to escape the temptation of "awe" and of "opening" and to grasp "openness" which images (verb) not only back onto Being but also beyond into Otherness. The new conjunction which conjoins both Being and Otherness is Azimuth; azimuth faces both everywhere and nowhere and is the first glimpse of the possibility of otherness.

What are the hints that suggest that Barthes is

stretching the reader and that he does not merely attempt to excite through clever manipulation of words and structure. We must now look at the context of this excerpt. In its own context, within the book it is but one of a number of signs; signs not symbols, for is that not the message conveyed in the title "Empire of Signs"? That is, the point of the writing is not for reflection; the point is the subliminal reaction to a work which questions the reader's participation in an instituted form, eating. Yet at the level of sign, the passage also questions the reader about reading; about acceptable meaning; about insight through reading or a flippancy put to words. The sign, however, is but a part of the total. These signs belong to an Empire (a union bound into a dominion by rule). Yet Barthes' use of the sign grows out of an opening within that Empire, an opening which allows a questioning of the Empire itself.

To remain at the meaning of the words, to remain at the excitement and elegance of the speaking is to miss the **saying**. It is to miss the azimuth out of which the work has "come into". It is to also miss the azimuth which the co-authored text of the reader can "come into". Barthes has at once piled the stakes for and against the reader. His words are an invitation to glimpse the arc as it traces beyond horizon, yet the acceptance of the invitation can also be an intoxicating agent which qwells the spirit behind the beauty

of the writing or the seduction of Being.

Azimuth of the Talk

His visit was a surprise but a welcome diversion from the thick of winter. Two years is a long time, but surprisingly little had changed for either of us; a change in location but mostly the same interests, the same goals and still not able to find quite enough time to play as much tennis as we would like. After two years we walked onto the court and played the same game - that's progress!

We were busy exploring the city, pointing out the sights and visiting night spots; two weeks isn't a lot of time.

It was an insignificant run to the store the night before he left, that brought it on. We just went for some mix; we talked about his new car, whether we should buy more ice, the city, ad infinitum - nothing really; idle talk. On looking back, those idle words were the renewal of our friendship.

What is this feeling which was refounded in the idle talking? How does it grow out of the words? Often a friend whom we have not seen in a long time will come to visit. On

occasion, a depth of communion will be born, or perhaps reborn, with that person. In a sense it comes from the talk; the settings will vary - a stroll in the park, driving to the airport, or going to the corner store; the topics will vary as well. Out of the talking, from some "where" beyond the words an experiential fullness pervades both friends.

From the time of arrival, the person's physical presence, <u>being</u> together, is a renewed companionship. It is the fulfilling of an expectancy, a happiness and excitement at his or her actual presence; being together, a good sort of feeling.

Yet in that insignificant idle talk there is a qualitative change in the feeling of being together. Two people are together but the talk makes you more, it goes beyond. The shared experiences of a past are the horizon upon which this new meeting takes place. The will, the good will which grows out of those experiences creates an "opening". Yet this "opening" is also a memorial to the elapsed two years; the opening monitors the meeting through the memorial which is always a context.

Out of the conjunction of horizon and opening, the possibility of a new constituting, the possibility of an arc to otherness, bursts forth; the spark unnoticed leaps from opening to "openness". Suddenly, yet undetected, the insignificance of idle talk, talk which is not the meaning of the words, has become **saying.** The speaking of the talk

relinquishes its hold; in that relinquishing speaking goes beyond.

That this experience of "openness" does not happen more often, even with our friends, attests to the hold the speaking has over saying. In this case, the "talk" goes beyond the speaking of being. The talk goes beyond the presence of two beings, it unifies the two, as friends in brotherhood (humanhood). The talk is the azimuth which made founded-meeting more than speaking, in opening, from horizon; in "openness" the founded-meeting sparks the gap to otherness.

## Conclusion

Words, like a cascade of water plummetting over a precipice, tend to hide what speaks. We become captivated by the catapulting water, hurtling (itself?) through the air. We become awed by the fall, the falling. We call them falls; the overwhelmed spectator is pulled, feels the water rotate the world; he borders on vertiginous suppliance. The falls has become the thing. What is before the falling?

In front of me is this falling water; the water is; the falling is; Being is manifested in both. Beyond each is what is not, the otherness than water; water - viscous fluid; syrupy movement which nevertheless remains one in stretch, run and swirl. Yet here at the fall, the point of

the Being of water, there opens a fissure to otherness. Water separating, chasing, reaching, passing but splitting apart again; or not really joining in waterness, yet still water, in a sense. Forever in a moment, what it **is** not, that is, what it **not-is**. The evidence of the pulling apart remains at the bottom; history to a turbulent fracturing, as great as the mighty splitting of the minutest particles of Being. A fracturing which is not a splitting; an up-welling which seemed to be but was not.

The thunderous roar, the foaming, the catapulting, all rest within being; all are signals that otherness does up-well through itself. Each of these signals is also subject to the same up-welling that they are signals of. And here farther down the stream, away from the fissure, the confrontation, the up-welling remains hidden yet remains. The quietude, the some-how swirled but reconstituted water glints and shimmers bespeaking a deeper saying of the flowing water.

It is the same force kindled within the water which makes it a river and that exposes the fissure in the falling. The azimuth is a conjunction of a precise moment at a precise place, where the force which makes the river releases, yet also simultaneously creates the flowing. Azimuth must include more than this as well; it must include an attitude of the person looking-participating. Without the perspectivizing, there is a river, a falling but no

azimuth.

Once the conjunction, azimuth, has been achieved, the river is different; in a sense it is rivering in a way similar to the way the falls are falling. Even in the gentle splishing ripple before the bend, the azimuth becomes possible. **Falling is a flowing; in any flowing falling is inherent.**

Words overwhelm the reader in a manner not unlike the water running over the falls. It is up to us to re-cognize (un-cognize) the fissuring as they stream from our pens and before our eyes and off of our ears. Speaking, over saying, and listening, over hearing, hold the frontier; they hold at that point where they fail. The horizon or the fissure is the defining aspect of that frontier. By dwelling within the defining principle, by reaching the horizon, it is no longer what it was. It always recedes to another point, that point always maintained by the defining principle. Horizon is the dimensional aspect of the vertex of Being - horizontal and vertical are both limits and defining aspects of Being itself. What is needed is a catapulting, a charge to access azimuth, the arc of (to) otherness from horizon. With this, what once remained as a potential for horizon can be opened into (onto) azimuth. **Saying is a speaking; in any speaking saying is inherent.**

## Epilogue

We must admit the sensuous world, even in our language. It is by subtle means of superordinate distanciation (abstraction) that we use ana-logos (analogy) to live with ideas. Through an intimate life in and of language, we become distanced from that sensuality with intervening layers of social, economic and political meanings. These words are at some level imbued with the sensuality which is the world. This intimacy greatly influences how the world calls; how we call that world.

The task has been to examine this relationship in the metamorphoses of life which we call experience. My personal quest has been sketched in the preceding pages. The vision is often cramped and made remote by language, a language which supports and helps a larger social system evolve. The path itself is the evidence that there is a different vision which can engage us, yet to follow only the sign-posts is to miss the path. The exploration must be co-created, co-authored, if the text is to be an opportunity to reach into the depths of that vision. The act of the glancing and the glance are creations and are not insignificant in themselves.

The irony of the searching is that the path emerges in so far as obstacles are present; with no obstacles there is no movement - once the obstacles are found, they impede the progress. The strategy employed must consider both; it must bring forth the obstacle and the movement.

Through an attempt to have sign-posts show themselves, a path toward horizon was entertained. The "opening" which resulted was a trick of Being to reinstitute itself. To maintain the vision one must arc to "openness"; one must attain azimuth.

The quest of azimuth is beginning. At the moment we can say that azimuth is not horizon; that it is (not-is) more, it is other. In some way azimuth requires non-clarification, a saying. At the moment it refers to at least three notions: a) an arc crossing from horizon to otherness, b) the horizon of otherness, and c) otherness. Perhaps a fruitful place to begin would be a researching into the limits of the property of negation and the role it plays in defining and/or pointing beyond.

This paper, beyond its words, is a **quest**, a **quest**ioning, for a return to an affluent language; a language rich in its saying; a language rich in its possibilities of saying. That quest is a challenge to the basic notion that words must be made ever more

precise. We must explore language in its personification of the labyrinths of the mind; in chimeras of experience and the awe of creation. We must explore the writing of indocile texts.

You stranger: Music. Space that's outgrown us,
heart-space. Innermost ours,
that, passing our limits, outsurges,-
holiest parting:
where what is within surrounds us
as practised horizon, as other
side of the air,
pure,
gigantic,
no longer lived in.

(Rilke, from To Music, 1983, p.78)

From one word to the other
What I say vanishes
I know that I am alive
Between two parentheses.

(Paz, from Certainty, 1971, p. 57)

## NOTES

[1] The idea for this springs from reading a poem of Borges. I have rewritten much of it and left out other parts. I dare not make him accountable for what is written here by using quotation marks.

[2] This use of logos as oracular response can be seen in Pindar, Pythian Odes, IV, 59. Although we have over one hundred fragments remaining from Heracleitus, we know where to place only the first two. As a result of this and because of the small amount of writing left, there is a great difficulty in translating the works. For a slight variation of this first quote I include Freeman's translation:

> The Law (logos, the intelligible Law of the universe) is as here explained; but men are always incapable of understanding it, both before they hear it, and when they have heard it for the first time. For though all things come into being in accordance with this Law, men seem as if they had never met with it, when they meet with words and actions such as I expound, separating each thing according to its nature and explaining how it is made.

[3] Aristotle speaks of this in his Metaphysics 3, 1047 a3-7. He traces the Protagorean relativity back to the doctrine of Parmenides in Metaphysics 5, 1009 a6-b25.

[4] I say return because in my use at the moment it is not "instituted". It is not a noun although it seems to fill the syntactical place in the sentence where a noun would be appropriate. It is not a noun; a person, place or thing.

[5] See page 76 for a detailed discussion of this title.

[6] I have drawn most heavily on On the Way to Language and Building Dwelling Thinking by Heidegger; The Visible and the Invisible by Merleau-Ponty; and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence by Levinas.

[7] We are inevitably led to a hermeneutic circle (where we accept an alleged logical contradiction); however, this does not give us an original notion of the hermeneutic relation; that is to say that we always remain talking about.

[8] In long form this gives us the following three sentences; a)I direct myself to that world which begins a new each morning; b)I direct as dwelling in and of the world myself to that world which begins each morning; c)I direct my manner, my conduct, to that world which begins each morning.

[9] Merleau-Ponty, in The Visible and the Invisible, is seeking to know what "the being of the world means." He points out that by looking at the world I am not a spectator to it; it is not a synthesis but a metamorphosis; the world is both absolute proximity and irremediable distance. My body seems to be built around the perception that dawns through it.

> Every attempt to reinstate the illusion of the "thing itself" is in fact an attempt to return to my imperialism and to the value of my thing. (Merleau-Ponty 1968, footnote p. 10)

The notion of subject and object in no way helps to clarify our relationship with the world and ourselves. The distinction merely draws out its consequences, using the dichotomy tacitly. The perceived world is below, and in this sense in a more muted world, the antinomy of the being-object or being-subject. This debate for Merleau-Ponty signals a necessary revision of our ontology.

[10] The depth of Merleau-Ponty's insight can be seen when he cautions that it is not through Being or Nothingness that we can achieve "openness"; rather it is the reverse. Being and Nothingness "come into" themselves as we achieve openness. The result of this is that to reach a horizon is to be still bounded within being.

[11] The term "nothingness" is often used by Levinas, but it is to be understood as still residing in Being. It seems as though Levinas did not recognize this development in Merleau-Ponty nor in Sartre. Yet, there are many striking similarities in the terms which Levinas develops and the terms Merleau-Ponty uses. For example, "trace", "fissure" and "proximity" are crucial to Levinas' notion of other than being and all three are found in The Visible and The Invisible.

[12] An examination of Levinas' total development of "Other than Being" quickly shows areas of divergence from Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. I would add that such an analysis also show contradictions within his own work. This is apparent when he deals with his notion of "subjectivity". Subjectivity, as other than being, is in no way a part of Being. It is "interruption of that invincible persistence of essence" (p.14). It is before, it is the exception of Being. Based on this notion of subjectivity, we are commanded by responsibility when we gaze into the face of the other. This particular development of "other than being" has unfortunate consequences for the integrity of his text.

We are now faced with two competing notions of other than being as they are traced through his development of a) subjectivity, and b) saying. In the said, saying is hidden and distorted, yet is still an essential feature of the said. The task is to go beyond them to saying. We can look for hints within Being itself for Other than Being. On the other hand subjectivity is no where to be seen except in one's vulnerability in the face of the other. Instead of investigating into other than being, we are left to accept his word that subjectivity is other than being.

[13] I am using the structural form of a dialogue to illustrate the interacting of the "di". It is made more physical. You the reader see the two and become spectator to the dialogue. Yet the written dialogue is in its own way an instituting. As the reader, you are spectator-co-author of this dialogue. To read the 'form' itself questions the reader in order to allow constituting by you the co-author. The form you are presented with has aspects to which the two in the dialoguing cannot possibly have access. The layout of 'hand shake' is visual. The final statement is written in such a way that it is for the co-author; again it is visual not oral.

[14] See Of Grammatology. (Trans. G.C. Spivak) Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976. He credits Heidegger with this notion although he modifies it.

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